Governance in health care delivery : raising performance by Lewis, Maureen & Pettersson, Gunilla
Policy Research Working Paper 5074





Development Economics Department 



















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5074
The impacts of health care investments in developing and 
transition countries are typically measured by inputs and 
general health outcomes. Missing from the health agenda 
are measures of performance that reflect whether health 
systems are meeting their objectives; public resources 
are being used appropriately; and the priorities of 
governments are being implemented. This paper suggests 
that good governance is central to raising performance 
in health care delivery. Crucial to high performance are 
standards, information, incentives and accountability. 
This paper provides a definition of good governance in 
health and a framework for thinking about governance 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Department and the Human Development Department—is part 
of a larger effort in both departments to understand governance and sector policy. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mlewis1@worldbank.org.  
issues as a way of improving performance in the health 
sector. Performance indicators that offer the potential for 
tracking relative health performance are proposed, and 
provide the context for the discussion of good governance 
in health service delivery in the areas of budget and 
resource management, individual provider performance, 
health facility performance, informal payments, and 
corruption perceptions. What we do and do not know 
about effective solutions to advance good governance and 
performance in health is presented for each area, drawing 
on existing research and documented experiences. 
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1. Introduction 
The impacts of investments in health care delivery in developing and transition 
countries are typically measured by inputs and outcomes. Individual programs 
sometimes track specific intermediary outputs such as immunization coverage or 
percentage of HIV/AIDS patients under treatment but these examine specific programs 
rather than the overall health care delivery system. Focusing on inputs, while critical, 
does not capture whether resources are actually deployed or how they are used. Relying 
on outcomes (typically life expectancy or infant and maternal mortality) to measure the 
effectiveness of service delivery is hampered by the fact that these events only occur 
once and are often determined by factors beyond the control of service providers. 
Missing from the health agenda are measures of performance that reflect how well the 
health care delivery system is operating, and whether services are being provided 
effectively. This is difficult to measure but it is critical to do so if health systems are to 
achieve their objectives and ensure reasonable returns to public investments. This paper 
suggests that using good governance as an entry point can help to focus on performance 
in health care delivery, and in turn, provide policymakers and program managers with a 
basis upon which to raise performance. 
What is good governance and why does it matter? 
Good governance in health systems promotes effective delivery of health services. 
Critical are appropriate standards, incentives, information, and accountabilities, which 
induce high performance from public providers (Box 1).
1 Sound provider performance 
in turn, raises the level of health outputs (e.g. number of treated patients) and can 
contribute to improved outcomes (e.g. health status). This paper focuses on incentives, 
information, and accountability, that does not mean standards are unimportant, rather 
these are implicit in the discussion throughout.  
Improved public performance is one means to enhance returns to public health 
investments. It can also reduce health service quality disparities if targeted properly.
2 
Moreover, good governance can discourage corruption, an outgrowth of poor 
governance, which directly affects performance of the health sector. The remainder of 
the paper elaborates on the themes of good governance and public sector performance, 
and the ways in which they apply to health. 
This paper provides an overview of governance issues in health care service delivery. It 
does not address the issues surrounding the raising of revenues for the national 
financing system, including (social) insurance. Those topics are addressed in Savedoff 
and Gottret (2008), Savedoff and Fuenzalida (2008) and Schieber (1997) among others. 
It attempts instead to identify what we do and do not know about effective solutions to 
                                                            
1 The term governance is used in various senses in the health and public sector management fields. How 
hospitals are governed and their governing structure is common referred to as the “governing structure” 
and there are governing boards for hospitals (McKee and Healy 2002; Harding and Preker 2003; La 
Forgia and Couttolenc 2008). We use it in a different sense in this paper, and it is used consistently 
throughout. 
2 Because the issues of equity and financial protection have been addressed extensively elsewhere they 
are not addressed explicitly here. Improving the effectiveness and performance of health care delivery is a 
key ingredient in reaching all citizens and raising both the quality and scope of health care delivery.  
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advance good governance and performance in health, drawing heavily on the existing 
work of many researchers, specialists, and practitioners. The paper defines governance, 
presents a governance framework, and proposes a set of indicators to track performance 
in health care delivery across countries and over time. The aim is to improve sector 
performance, complementing other elements of health care delivery that are not covered 
here, such as medical training, clinical protocols, service coverage or, of course, 
standards. 
What is good governance? Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004; 2007) define it as 
the “traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the 
common good”, which includes the process of selecting those in authority, capacity of 
the government to manage, and respect for the state (see Annex 1). While desirable for 
the economic and social wellbeing of countries, these factors are not always necessary 
and are not sufficient to ensure effective public provision of health services. Good 
governance in health requires enabling conditions: the existence of standards, 
information on performance, incentives for good performance, and, arguably most 
importantly, accountability (Box 1). How effectively these elements generate good 
governance hinges on the management of public resources at all levels of the health 
system.  
Ackerman (2005) describes accountability as “a pro-active process by which public 
officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behavior and results, and 
are sanctioned accordingly.”
3 Accountability requires that public servants have clear 
responsibilities and are held answerable in exercising those responsibilities, and if they 
do not, face predetermined sanctions. Without sanctions there cannot be any real 
accountability. Despite its importance to effective delivery of health services, 
accountability is rare in most public health systems worldwide (Brinkerhoff 2004). 
Good governance also requires effective incentives at all levels of the health system, 
and both benchmarks for and information on performance in order to induce and sustain 
desirable behavior. 
In health care systems, poor governance accounts for much of the inefficiency in service 
provision, and in some cases results in no service at all. Lack of, standards, information, 
incentives, and accountability can not only lead to poor provider performance but also 
to corruption, “the use of public office for private gain” (Bardhan 1997: 139). However, 
the line between poor governance and corruption is often blurred. Is poor service a 
function of corruption or simply of mismanagement? Improving governance and 
(thereby) discouraging corruption in health systems aims to increase the efficiency of 
health services so as to raise performance, and ultimately, improve the health status of 
the population. 
The political economy context of health care plays an important role in determining 
whether the ideas and analysis presented here have a chance of implementation. Indeed, 
some of the performance issues outlined in the paper stem from special interests that 
have captured the agenda and undermine performance. What is intended here is to focus 
on topics that help to foster good governance and performance in health care systems.   
                                                            
3 Ackerman distinguishes it from transparency and responsiveness, which have elements of importance, 
but are not substitutes for accountability.  
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Translating good governance into action 
The paper identifies the key incentive and accountability issues that underpin health 
sector performance. This section lays out the conceptual framework for developing and 
describing possible indicators that can be used to track performance in health care 
delivery. We are interested not simply in whether there is consultation or not between 
different stakeholders but also whether the public sector reaches an acceptable standard 
of performance. That performance entails basic functioning of the health system so that 
funds are budgeted and allocated effectively; physicians, nurses, and other health staff 
are hired based on objective criteria; administrators, physicians, and nurses work their 
contracted hours; basic drugs, medical supplies, and equipment are available; incentives 
are set to promote good performance; and corruption is discouraged. Without these 
basic ingredients the broader health objectives cannot be attained. This paper, however, 
does not address what is clinically necessary or constitutes adequate quality of care. It 
simply establishes some indicators that define basic parameters for a well functioning 
health care system. 
 
BOX 1. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE FUNDAMENTALS  
Standards are transparent and publicly known criteria or benchmarks used to assess 
and inform health policy, provision, and performance. 
Incentives are any financial or non-financial factors that motivate a specific type of 
behavior or action, and can be positive or negative, i.e. encourage a certain behavior 
or deter it. 
Information in the form of clear definitions of outputs and outcomes combined with 
accurate data on performance and results collected at regular intervals enables 
sanctions to be implemented when specified standards are not met.  
Accountability refers to the act of holding public officials/service providers 
answerable for processes and outcomes and imposing sanctions if specified outputs 
and outcomes are not delivered. 
For effective service delivery, central public policymakers must have a set of objectives 
that are clear to lower levels of government, which then translate policy into viable 
programs that can be adopted by local government to guide implementation by service 
providers. For instance, (1) ministries of finance and parliaments set budget levels and 
broad health priorities; (2) ministries of health define specific health objectives and 
translate those objectives into health policies and programs, and (3) depending on 
whether the health system is centralized or decentralized, central or local government 
implements by constructing hospitals and clinics, hiring physicians and nurses, 
providing complementary inputs, and contracting out or managing facilities. This 
process must contain appropriate incentives, performance information, and 
accountability mechanisms at each level of the health system if the desired performance 
standards are to be attained and sustained (Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1. OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE PROCESS 
 
Source: Authors. 
Performance is determined by the nature of these relationships across policymakers, 
policy implementers, and direct providers. How things get done and performance at the 
provider level are informed by overall health policy but is defined through the specific 
policies and procedures of the health bureaucracy at central and/or local levels. These 
policies and procedures have built-in incentives, implicit and explicit, which drive 
performance in health service delivery, and can work at cross purposes or be mutually 
reinforcing.
4 
The lines of accountability directly influence the effectiveness of performance 
incentives. Physicians and nurses hired, paid, and deployed by ministries of health 
become accountable to central government, not to local government, the community, or 
households, as these entities have no financial or other leverage to hold health service 
providers accountable for their performances. The distance between provider and 
central government/ministries of health can therefore become very long, and as a result, 
real accountability through these channels can evaporate. 
While health service providers should be accountable to the ministry of health, local 
governments, citizens and other stakeholders, in reality, that is not always the case. 
Inadequate incentives and the lack of information and authority to hold providers 
                                                            
4 Sometimes health systems contain implicit incentives that lead to unintended consequences. Explicit 





accountable together undermine provider performance. Health ministries’ authority, and 
therefore ability, to hold health providers accountable is often very limited, and this is 
true for citizens and local governments as well. It is only if the ministry of health has 
tools to reward and penalize behavior that there is real accountability. 
Figure 1 captures these relationships and the direction of incentives and of 
accountability between different levels of government, between government and 
providers, and between stakeholders and beneficiaries and government. It builds on 
concepts from the 2004 World development Report that suggested lines of 
accountability (long and short) among citizens, providers and the state (Box 2). Provider 
performance affects facility performance and the quality of service delivery, which can 
affect health outcomes but not always because outcomes in the sector are also affected 
by other factors (e.g. overall health status, patient behavior, and severity of illness). 
 
BOX 2. THE LONG AND SHORT ROUTES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The World Development Report 2004 developed an accountability triangle across 
policymakers, providers, and citizens, and it provides a useful starting point. In this 
context, accountability of service providers such as health clinics is achieved either by 
the short route, involving direct feedback from citizens to their public providers, or the 
long route, which requires altruistic politicians and policymakers to act as 
intermediaries for their citizens. 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2004c). 
To improve governance and subsequently the performance of health systems it is 
critical to identify the weak points that contribute to poor performance and corruption. 
The governance process outlined in Figure 1 provides clues as to where governance 
failures tend to occur. For example, pervasive physician and nurse absenteeism in 
developing countries is symptomatic of governance failure due to little or no 
accountability of providers to employers and/or patients. Budget leakages, where public 
health funds fail to reach intended recipients, offers another indicator of governance 
failure due to some combination of lack of incentives to track funds, weak information 
systems that thwart the ability to ensure that funds reach providers, and absence of  
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mechanisms to hold officials to account. These shortcomings together also prevent 
effective management as those in charge are not empowered to ensure that performance 
reaches at least a minimum standard (e.g. that workers come to work or that informal 
payments are not required to receive care). 
 
 
2. Good Governance in Health Care Delivery: Measuring Performance 
Measuring performance is critical to establishing benchmarks for efficiency, comparing 
performance across time and providers, and assessing effectiveness of public health 
expenditure. Accountability hinges on having adequate information about performance 
in health service delivery, which means having reliable indicators that help 
policymakers and program administrators improve service delivery. This is an area that 
has received little attention on the global health agenda, which has remained focused on 
general outcome indicators such as life expectancy, and infant and maternal mortality. 
Although helpful for setting strategic health priorities, these measures are infrequently 
updated and are strongly influenced by factors other than health care provision, making 
them less desirable metrics for tracking either performance or outcomes of health 
investments.
5  
The incentives and accountabilities depicted in Figure 1 and explained in Box 1 are 
difficult to measure typically requiring use of proxy indicators. For indicators where 
there is no direct measure alternatives are required. For example, accountability cannot 
be captured directly so we rely on examination of arrangements that promote and 
demonstrate accountability. Having clear rewards and disciplinary actions for under- or 
non-performing staff and a track record that demonstrates that medical staff are indeed 
held to account suggests that there is accountability in the system but whether that 
process persists and expands to other aspects of service delivery is not assured. Thus, 
there may be accountability but this can only be inferred, not confirmed. Corruption 
may be easier to quantify but measures tend to be based on perceptions or reported 
behaviors, which have a large probability of error (see section 7). The performance 
indicators presented here are only a start and highlight the importance of additional 
work to develop viable performance measures for health care delivery. Before turning 
to specific indicators it is important to keep in mind that good governance is simply a 
means to building sound institutions, in this case in the health sector.  
The indicators proposed here are generic enough to be adapted to different settings and 
can serve as a basis for cross-country and within country comparisons over time, and 
offer a menu of options. Some require information that can be relatively easily and 
frequently collected (e.g. type of provider payment system), others demand expensive 
data collection.
6 Thus, some indicators yield immediate insights into performance (e.g. 
absenteeism studies), and others, such as large surveys, provide a snapshot of 
performance that complements other measures of health care delivery performance. The 
                                                            
5 Infant mortality in the low income countries is often based on epidemiological models that project 
changes in infant deaths and other demographic factors based on data from the previous decade making it 
particularly unsatisfactory for tracking trends in the IMR. 
6 See Vian (2008) for a discussion of some of these instruments and their applicability to the governance 
and anti-corruption agenda.  
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menu approach allows anticipation of information needs and the opportunity to 
piggyback on planned surveys.   
Table 1 proposes indicators that can be used to detect and assess performance in health 
care systems and serves as an overview of the types of governance challenges discussed 
in this paper (aggregate-level governance indicators are discussed in Annex 1). Only 
indicators for which at least some data are available are shown, other indicators of 
governance but for which there are very limited or no data, are discussed in the text. 
Each indicator is defined and its salient features briefly discussed, the indicators are 
then elaborated on in each relevant subsequent section under the aggregate groupings: 
budget and resource management, individual providers, health facilities, informal 
payments, and corruption. 
Budget and Resource Management 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the flow of funds through the government 
bureaucracy offers an indication of the operational effectiveness of the government’s 
financial management functions. While sectoral measures of the flow of funds is 
generally preferable, how well the overall system operates provides a benchmark for the 
health sector as financial management tends to be less efficient in ministries of health 
than in either ministries of finance, or on average across government ministries, 
although there are notable exceptions. 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators are expert 
ratings of budget performance and are designed to track budget credibility, 
transparency, and the performance of key institutions involved in the budget cycle. 
They effectively provide an overall assessment of how well the budget process works. 
While these indicators currently only exist for overall public financial management, the 
process of developing sector-specific indicators is ongoing.  
Budget leakages are the discrepancy between the authorized budget for health and the 
amount of funds received by intended recipients. Leakages may occur at multiple points 
in the health system: outflows from one level to inflows at the next level, inflows and 
outflows within a specific level, and leakages across multiple levels. Sometimes 
leakages are reported for broad expenditure categories, e.g. total public health 
expenditure, sometimes for specific expenditure areas, e.g. payments to providers in a 
particular local district. 
One component of total budget leakages is payroll irregularities associated with ghost 
workers, those listed on payroll but who no longer (or never did) work for the Ministry 
of Health or a lower level of government. Ghost workers are typically measured as the 
discrepancy between the number of physicians and nurses on payroll and those included 
in official employment records. Payroll irregularities can also result in workers who are 
not paid because employment records fail to include them.  
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TABLE 1. PERFORMANCE ISSUES AND INDICATORS FOR HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
 
AREA ISSUE KEY INDICATORS
Budget processes
PEFA indicators track budget credibility, comprehensiveness, 
transparency, execution, recording, reporting, and external audits 
and scrutiny.
Budget leakages Discrepancy between public budgeted health funds and the 
amounts received by health providers.
Payroll irregularities Discrepancy between payroll roster and health workers on site.
In-kind supply leakages
Differences in price paid for similar medical supplies/equipment 
across health facilities.
Type of procurement used for drugs and supplies.
Job purchasing Frequency of illegal side-payments/bribes influencing hiring 
decisions and of payments for particular assignments.
Physician credentials
Existence and enforcement of licensing requirements and of 
continuing education programs.
Health worker absenteeism
Fraction of physicians or nurses contracted for service but not on 
site during the period(s) of observation. 
Health worker performance Direct observation of adherence to treatment protocols, medical 



















Average length of stay, bed occupancy, infection and mortality 




















Frequency of illegal charges for publicly provided health services.
Perceptions of corruption
Fraction of households, citizens or public officials reporting 
corruption in health.
Relative ranking of health sector on corruption indices.











































































In-kind supply leakages are common in many health systems. Given the importance of in-kind 
drugs and consumables received by hospitals and clinics in lieu of funds to purchase these inputs 
the management of these goods from purchase to the end-user and at the point of use is central to 
good governance and effective service delivery. There are notable differences between drugs and 
medical supplies, with the former being a more variable and portable commodity, and certainly, 
more valuable. It is very difficult to directly assess the effectiveness of procurement processes, 
warehousing, and management. One very useful indicator sometimes available, which captures 
procurement mismanagement or potential fraud is the difference in price paid for similar medical 
supplies/equipment across health facilities that cannot be explained by other factors. Assessment 
of the types of procurement processes and warehousing systems in use can also yield information 
on potential governance problems. 
Individual Providers 
Medical staff claims a large proportion of government budgets and pose a significant 
management challenge given the difficulty of allocating and supervising a large cadre of public 
workers. The indicators discussed below reflect the need for assessment of the hiring and 
supervision process. It is arguably more difficult to assess health worker performance. 
Job purchasing refers to the purchasing of public positions, which bypasses hiring based on 
objective criteria. Such indicators are typically based on perceptions of the extent to which 
personnel hiring decisions are influenced by illegal payments, measured as the share of 
respondents who regard job purchasing to be common or very common, and in rare cases, the 
“cost” of a particular job. These perceptions often differ depending on the position of the 
respondent in the health system hierarchy making it important to use a cross section of 
individuals. Related to the purchasing of posts are nepotism and favoritism in hiring. The 
former is defined as the illegal preference given to a relative, the latter to any person, without 
consideration of relative merit or other objective factors. Mainly anecdotal and occasionally 
some perception-based evidence is available on the prevalence of nepotism and favoritism. 
The existence and enforcement of physician credentials are important for health service 
provision. Although second best, having and enforcing licensing examinations that ensure basic 
knowledge, and require continuing education or refresher courses, indicate that clinicians have 
adequate clinical knowledge, which in turn influences their performance. 
Health worker absenteeism captures the absence of providers at their location of employment 
during contracted hours. It can be defined as the proportion of physicians or nurses who are 
contracted to be working on site during the period(s) of observation but who are not present. 
Provider absence is a measure of underperformance of health service providers and, depending 
on the reason for absence, fraud associated with unexcused absences. Physician and nurse 
absentee data can be collected by various means: surprise visits, direct observation at health 
clinics or hospitals, attendance records kept by health facility administrators, or other methods 
that document actual and expected attendance (see Chaudhury et al. 2006; Lewis 2006; and 
Halsey and Vegas 2008 for overviews). 
Health worker performance is notoriously difficult to reflect in a single indicator, especially 
since an individual’s performance depends not only on training, skill, and effort but also on that 
of co-workers, complementary inputs, and patient behavior. Some available indicators include 
adherence to treatment protocols and patient satisfaction ratings. Indirect measures including 
examination of the incentives and accountability mechanisms that providers face further help 
explain provider performance and are useful for designing improved arrangements.  
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Health Facilities 
Facility provider payments, that is, how health service providers are paid, is one of the most 
critical incentives for performance. Payment can be in the form of a base wage, wages with 
bonuses, earnings linked to production or performance, or lump sum payments for work either to 
be undertaken (e.g. pre-paid care) or that has been completed (e.g. pay for production or 
performance), or some combinations of these. It is an area that receives relatively little attention 
and most systems are straight wage-based arrangements. Simple hospital efficiency measures are 
among the easiest to collect and are important indicators of hospital performance. Average length 
of stay defined as the total number of days in inpatient or acute care institutions divided by the 
number of discharges or admissions, and bed occupancy rates defined as the percentage of 
hospital beds occupied over a given period of time provide a summary of performance and are 
important indicators of hospital performance. However, despite their usefulness these data are 
not routinely collected or used. Patient satisfaction ratings can provide further information 
though they are inadequate on their own.  
Informal Payments 
Under-the-table payments to individuals are charges for health services or supplies meant to be 
provided free of charge, or that are paid informally to public health care providers to obtain 
specific favors or even basic services. Types of informal payments include but are not restricted 
to fees for treatment, drugs, expedited or extra services, and as an insurance to receive better care 
in the future from physicians, nurses, and other health workers. Although informal payments 
may provide incentives for providers to be on site, they introduce questionable practices that 
undermine the intent of collective financing and permits corrupt practices to flourish. Informal 
payments are often measured as the fraction of survey respondents reporting that they made 
payments to a public health entity for services intended to be free of charge. Household surveys, 
health facility exit surveys, and perception surveys of citizens and public officials are the most 
common sources of this information. More detailed evidence can be collected on the average 
value of payments made, who requested/received them, and for what specific service. Data on 
informal payments in health are relatively scarce but are increasingly being added to household 
surveys. 
Corruption Perceptions 
In many countries the health sectors is perceived as corrupt and reflects to some extent the 
overall quality of institutions as it determines the ability to execute services. Such perceptions 
complement the measures discussed above. Aggregate measures of corruption and institutional 
quality are difficult to create given the breadth of relevant factors. Kauffman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007) have developed general indices of corruption that integrate the results from 
multiple perceptions surveys (see Annex 1).  
Health sector specific indicators of corruption and institutional quality exist. The World Bank’s 
Country Program and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) captures institutional quality and 
provides breakdowns by sector but includes a broad range of issues, some of which affect 
performance, and others that do not. Perceptions of corruption in publicly financed health care 
systems are generally reported by one of the following: the fraction of citizens, business people, 
or public officials perceiving corruption in the sector, or respondents’ ranking of corruption in 
the health sector relative to other sectors. While these indicators are imperfect they complement 
the objective indicators discussed above. Perceptions also matter as people may change their 
health seeking behavior based on these even if incorrect, and where perceptions are largely  
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negative it suggests the need to examine the performance of health service delivery more 
carefully. 
Potential data and information sources for the indicators outlined above are shown in Table 2. 
Some of the data and information are readily available and based on administrative data or 
financing arrangements. Others draw on large surveys, some of which have only been conducted 
in selected countries (e.g. Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys (QSDS) and Public Expenditure 
Tracking Surveys (PETS)). Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS), public expenditure reviews, and other household surveys, exist for more 
countries but are administered intermittently. Still, such surveys offer a wealth of data and the 
basis for useful analysis that can shed light on the effects of public investments on health service 
delivery performance. 
The set of indicators discussed in this section are unevenly available and only sometimes enable 
comparisons across countries, or over time, and even less often across regions and facilities 
within countries. However, when they do, they provide important insights into governance 
challenges and performance issues in the health sector. Ideally, data for indicators such as these 
should be collected on a regular basis and be made publicly available to provide the basis for 
improved incentives and accountability in health. 
The remainder of this paper places each indicator from Table 1 into context describing the 
underlying governance failure, and presents available evidence on potential solutions to address 
each of the governance challenges. 
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TABLE 2. SOURCES FOR PERFORMANCE DATA IN HEALTH SECTOR DELIVERY 
 
AREA ISSUE KEY SOURCES
Budget processes 
° Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability indicators
° Focus groups with public officials, recipient institutions, and civil society
° Interviews with public officials, recipient institutions, and civil society
Budget leakages
° Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
° Public Expenditure Reviews
° Focus groups with public officials, recipient institutions, and civil society
° Interviews with public officials, recipient institutions, and civil society
Payroll leakages
° Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
° Public Expenditure Reviews
° Household surveys
° Focus groups with public officials and health workers
In-kind leakages
° Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
° Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys
° Facility surveys
° Focus groups with public officials, recipient institutions, and health workers
Job purchasing
° Official administrative records combined with facility surveys
° Focus groups with public officials
° Governance and Anti-Corruption Country Diagnostic surveys  
Physician 
credentials








° Focus groups with facility heads and patients



















































° Facility exit surveys
° Focus groups with providers/patients and health workers
° Interviews with providers/patients and health workers













































































° Governance and Anti-Corruption Country Diagnostic surveys
° WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessement (CPIA) 
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3. Budget and Resource Management 
Without funding public health care services grind to a halt. The flow of public funds 
and the ability to manage funds at the provider level thus become the first level of 
concern for performance of the health care system (see Box 1). Where funds originate, 
consistency in disbursement and financial management combined with spending 
discipline at the clinic or hospital level are the broad categories of concern in budget 
and resource management. Public health care provision also relies on in-kind transfers 
of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and other inputs. Thus, there is a need to track 
funding as well as goods. Information on the flow of money and in-kind inputs are not 
always available but is a prerequisite. Incentives and accountabilities across the 
government from the Ministry of Finance through the Ministry of Health are relevant, 
and across all entities involved in dissemination of funding to health service providers. 
Subsequent sections discuss the issues as applied to individual providers and facilities.  
This section is concerned solely with how the flow of funds and supplies moves through 
the institutions identified in Figure 1.  
Weak governance structures, characterized by low capacity to plan, allocate and execute 
budgets; weak internal controls; poor management and supervision of funds; absence of 
external accountability (including audits); and distorted incentives that increase the 
opportunity for mismanagement and fraud, affect the funding received by health service 
providers, and therefore the delivery of health services. Table 3 outlines common 
vulnerabilities in public financial management (PFM) systems by area. 
An added complication in health is that the sector sometimes has very sizable off-
budget accounts. Health Insurance Funds and health facility revolving funds or drug 
revolving funds are often managed outside the budget process. In Turkey for example, 
off budget accounts constitute more than half of the health budget, placing them outside 
the purview of regular budget allocation, discipline and oversight processes (World 
Bank 2006). This is arguably an even bigger problem in African countries in which 
donor health funding is substantial, especially for HIV/AIDS activities.  
Public financial management has well developed standards and benchmarks for 
performance that are widely endorsed although not always followed. Ensuring sound 
financial arrangements that limit leakages is the first step in building a high 
performance public sector, including health, and basic incentives and accountabilities 
are the backbone of successful arrangements.  
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TABLE 3. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNACE VULNERABILITIES IN PUBLIC 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT  
 
Measuring budget performance 
It is difficult to assess budget performance directly but some very useful process 
indicators exist based on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
framework. This uses a comprehensive set of 31 indicators to assess overall 
performance of public finance management systems (PEFA Secretariat 2005).
7 
Indicators especially relevant to health are shown in Table 4. 
The PEFA indicators are rated from 1-4 with + modifiers (4 indicating strongest 
performance).
8 Scores for three of the PEFA indicators relevant to health: (1) aggregate 
expenditure compared to original approved budget (in some countries there are large 
discrepancies suggesting that allocated resources do not reach service providers), (2) 
effectiveness of payroll controls (a particularly critical issue for health given the payroll 
costs in health are the largest among government sectors), and (3) availability of 
information on resources received by service delivery units.  
 
                                                            
7 At the time of writing, PEFA assessments have been carried out in approximately 100 countries, out of 
which roughly 40 assessments are publicly available. 
8 The PEFA indicators are rated from A (best) to D with + modifiers, here we have converted them into 
numerical values for ease of exposition. 
Vulnerabilities
• Absence of clear rules on hiring
• Absence of management controls, internal controls
• Absence or weakness in internal audit, external audit
• Absence of treasury payroll matching
• Absence of records, weak record record keeping
• Absence of management mandates for and review of 
regular financial reports
• Absence of nonpayroll expenditure controls
• Absence of inventory control, asset registry
• Weak procurement system
• Absence of management oversight and review of payment 
and procurement practices
• Cash or in-kind transfers
• Weak or no record keeping
• Absence of clear procedures for processing applicants
• Failure to follow procedures
• Absence of clear laws, regulations, rules for eligibility, 
criteria
• Absence of nonpayroll expenditure controls
• Absence of management oversight and review of payment 
and procurement practices
• Weak procurement system









TABLE 4. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (PEFA) 
INDICATORS RELEVANT TO HEALTH 
 
The PEFA indicators are useful for identifying where in the budget process governance 
problems exist. For example, a poor score on the aggregate expenditures compared to 
original approved budget may be a sign of poor management, inadequate monitoring of 
processes, poor recordkeeping, and/or weak disbursement systems. In any event, there 
is a clear absence of accountability in financial management. If a country scores low on 
the effectiveness of payroll controls indicator, the problem of payroll leakages, or 
payment to the wrong individual, may be serious. A low score on availability of 
information on resources received by service delivery units suggests some combination 
of inadequate transparency, poor recordkeeping, low budget management capacity, and 
insufficient accountability. 
Data for five countries are shown in Figure 2 to illustrate relative performance across 
these three areas. Bangladesh scores relatively poorly on all three indicators; the 
Dominican Republic scores the worst on aggregate expenditure compared to original 
approved budget; Macedonia scores relatively poorly on information on resources 
received by service delivery units; and Mozambique and Ukraine perform poorly with 
respect to effectiveness of payroll controls. PEFA indicators can thus be helpful in 
pinpointing and prioritizing areas where action is needed to strengthen budget processes 
and help bolster good governance in PFM. 
 
Predictability and control in 
budget execution
Budget credibility Budget comprehensiveness 
and transparency
° Predictability in the availability of 
funds for commitment of 
expenditures
° Aggregate expenditure outturn 
compared to original approved 
budget
° Transparency of inter-
governmental fiscal relations
° Recording and management of 
cash balances, debt and 
guarantees
° Composition of expenditure out-
turn compared to original 
approved budget
° Public access to key fiscal 
information
° Effectiveness of payroll controls
° Competition, value for money 
and controls in procurement
° Effectiveness of internal 
controls for non-salary 
expenditure
° Effectiveness of internal audit
Policy-based budgeting Accounting, recording and 
reporting
External scrutiny and audit
° Orderliness and participation in 
the annual budget process
° Availability of information on 
resources received by service 
delivery units
° Scope, nature and follow-up of 
external audit
Source: PEFA Secretariat  (2005). 
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FIGURE 2. SELECTED PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY (PEFA) INDICATORS BY COUNTRY, 2005-07 
 
Source: PEFA Secretariat (various years). 
Budget Leakages 
Weaknesses in budget management can result in funds never arriving at their intended 
destination due to mismanagement or theft. And, where allocated health funding is not 
disbursed, or is diverted en route from the point of disbursement to health facilities, 
health service delivery tends to suffer. 
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) and Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) 
are means to track funds and scrutinize the flow of public resources in health across 
layers of the administrative hierarchy (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 2005; Reinikka and 
Smith 2004; Savedoff 2008).
9 Tracking inflows, understanding spending, and 
identifying where governance failures may arise, PETS and PERs complement what 
PEFA evidence reveals about government-wide performance, thereby offering an 
important diagnostic on budget management and possible leakages.  
Given the complexity of health systems PETS can be a useful tool for determining the 
stage at which leakages occur in the flow of funds, and what types of resource flows are 
most vulnerable to leakage in a particular country. There are several potential leakage 
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Aggregate expenditure outturn compared to original approved budget
Effectiveness of payroll controls
Availability of information on resources received by service delivery unit 
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points as illustrated in Figure 3: discrepancies between budgeted and disbursed funds at 
the central level; differences in outflows from one level to inflows at the subsequent 
level; differences between inflows and outflows within a specific level; and leakages 
across multiple levels in the chain of budget allocations (Savedoff 2008). 
 
FIGURE 3. OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL LEAKAGE POINTS 
 
Source: Savedoff (2008). 
Evidence from PETS illustrates the extent of leakages in the health sector and provides 
tentative leakage patterns (Table 5). Certain types of funding seem to be more 
susceptible to leakages: discretionary as opposed to rule-based, in-kind (e.g. medical 
supplies and drugs) compared to budgets for those items, and non-wage versus wage 
funds, mainly because rules are more transparent, set clear parameters, and can be more 
easily monitored and audited (Gauthier 2006; Savedoff 2008). 
 
TABLE 5: BUDGET LEAKAGES OF NON-WAGE FUNDS IN HEALTH IN 



























































Expenditure program Leakage (%)
Ghana (2000) Discretionary non-wage funds 80
Uganda (2000) Drugs and supplies 70
Tanzania (1999) Non-wage funds 41
Ghana (2000) Wage funds 20
Source: Lindelow, Kushnarova, and Kaiser (2006). 
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Good PETS are driven by specific policy questions allowing the identification of the 
point(s) at which substantial leakages occur, and ideally why, thereby enabling 
appropriate solutions to be found (Savedoff 2008). A study in Chad tracked resource 
flows and revealed considerable fund leakages (Gauthier and Wane 2008). The findings 
helped determine which flows were more leakage prone, and at what points in the 
health system leakages occurred (Table 6). Resource flows included financial resources, 
medical materials, and main medications allocated to health care providers by the 
Ministry of Health (Gauthier and Wane 2008).  
Frontline service providers received only 1 percent out of the central non-wage 
recurrent budget compared to 33 percent of total recurrent resources, and the regional 
administrations received 27 percent of non-wage resources compared to 50 percent of 
total recurrent resources (Gauthier and Wane 2006). This suggests that wages are less 
susceptible to leakage than non-wage funds, likely because workers know the size of 
their payments and have strong incentives to put pressure (when they have the means to 
do so) on officials to ensure delivery of their wages.
10  
Merely 5 percent of the resources received by the regional administrations were 
delivered to health facilities implying diversion of budgeted resources due to weak 
administration, mismanagement, and absence of oversight and audits at all levels of the 
health system. 
 
TABLE 6. RESOURCE LEAKAGES IN THE HEALTH SECTOR IN CHAD, 2003 
 
The common theme of PETS is that they detect leakages, an indicator of underlying 
governance failures in the form of missing incentives to track, record, and manage 
resources and the absence of performance information on which to base any sanctions, 
without which accountability of officials for ensuring that resources reach their intended 
destination does not exist.  
Payroll irregularities 
Physicians and nurses listed on payroll and being paid but who no longer, or never 
worked at a facility lead to payroll leakages due to the absence of accurate and updated 
employee records, functioning information systems, payroll controls, and internal and 
                                                            
10 Gauthier and Wane (2008: 58) define leakages as “how much the intended beneficiaries received 
versus how much they should have received as given by resources earmarked for them”. 
Non-wage Total Non-wage Total
% of resources received from 
previous level
27 50 5 65
% of resources received from 
central level allocation
--1 3 3
Source: Adapted from Gauthier and Wane (2008).
Resources received at regional 
level
(regional administration)




external controls (e.g. payroll audits). The flipside is not uncommon, where physicians 
and nurses on the payroll do not receive their wages, or receive them with great delay. 
Multiple reasons account for the discrepancy between the number of physicians and 
nurses on employee records and listed on payroll. Lists of physicians and nurses 
employed are sometimes kept by multiple agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Finance, and health facilities themselves) and are only updated infrequently. 
Where physicians or nurses have left, died, or retired, and those separations are not 
recorded there is often a disconnect between official records and actual physician and 
nurse numbers. Such problems, generally the result of administrative failures, suggest 
the need for efforts to strengthen both personnel and budget records and management 
capacity. PEFA indicators (see Table 4) may be useful in flagging this type of problem 
since a low score implies possible problems on payroll.  
Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) address governance problems, explicitly or 
implicitly, and contain indicators of, and potential solutions for identified governance 
failures. For example, the 2001 PER for Honduras provided detailed information and 
analysis of ghost workers in the health sector: the share of workers identified as ghosts 
ranged from close to 1 percent for auxiliary nurses to over 8 percent GPs. The main 
underlying problem identified was the weak personnel information system, which failed 
to accurately record and regularly update health staff deployment.  
Ghost workers on payroll are unlikely to be a one-sided operation by health workers 
(they may not be involved at all) rather, administrative staff in charge of maintaining 
payroll records have greater opportunity to manipulate records to siphon off wage 
payments (Lindelöw 2006). This is more likely to be the case when there are no or weak 
incentives to maintain information systems, and administrators in charge of maintaining 
information cannot be held accountable when discrepancies, intentional, e.g. to cover up 
irregularities, or not, e.g. mistakes in data entry, are revealed.  
In addition, where budgets or provider revenues are linked to outputs, error and fraud in 
recording of outputs can lead to leakages. In Uganda, ghost patients were estimated to 
account for, on average, 26.5 percent of all patients with a range of 0-80 percent 
(McPake et al. 1999). 
Leakages of drugs and medical supplies 
Public health systems face serious challenges in the procurement, warehousing, 
distribution, and management of in-kind drugs and medical supplies and equipment. 
Leakages of drugs and medical supplies and equipment along the supply-chain result in 
drug stock-outs, broken equipment not being fixed or replaced, and lack of supplies 
with subsequent adverse impacts on service delivery since such complementary inputs 
are key to health workers’ productivity and effectiveness.  
For instance, in Indonesia in 2002, the average health clinic (Puskemas) had 75-80 
percent of the essential drugs meant to be in stock (World Bank 2007b). In Nigeria 
many primary health facilities do not have the equipment and drugs necessary to 
provide basic services (World Bank 2008). In four surveyed states Bauchi, Cross River, 
Kaduna, and Lagos, essential drugs and medical equipment were severely lacking in 
most health facilities (Figure 4). For example, the share of facilities that had  
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thermometers ranged from 65 percent in Bauchi to 93 percent in Lagos, and the share 
with malaria smears from 15 percent to 42 percent. 
 
FIGURE 4. AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT IN FOUR NIGERIAN 
STATES 
 
Leakages of drugs pose a challenge to all countries and vigilance is crucial, especially 
for drugs with high “street prices”. In Ethiopia, users and providers in focus groups 
reported the stealing of public sector drugs, their resale in the private market, and 
dealings in contraband medicines. They acknowledged the lack of drugs in the public 
sector and the ready availability of those drugs in private pharmacies and clinics (Lewis 
2006). In Costa Rica, 32 percent of users indicated that they had prior knowledge of 
theft in government pharmacies (Cohen 2002). The average leakage rate for drugs in 
Uganda was estimated at 73 percent, ranging from 40 to 94 percent across 10 public 
health facilities. High demand drugs, such as those to treat malaria, were the least 
available to patients because health workers and the Health Unit Management 
Committee members, the entities meant to provide local oversight, expropriated them 
(McPake et al. 1999). However, a later facility exit survey in Uganda showed much 
higher drug availability and improved distribution (Lindelöw, Reinikka, and Svensson 
2003).
11 Public officials typically have significant discretion over the decisions made 
                                                            
11 More insidious and even harder to address is drug mishandling from the importation of substandard 
medications to the repackaging of drugs, substituting lower cost/quality medications, to the pilfering of 
drug supplies at points of service. The health consequences of tampering can be serious but rarely traced 
to the source of the problem due to lack of regulation, information, and enforcement (Lewis 2006). 








Facilities with availability (%)
Bauchi Cross River Kaduna Lagos Source: World Bank (2008).
Medical equipment 
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across the supply chain and if incentives, oversight, and accountability mechanisms 
either do not exist or are dysfunctional, mismanagement and theft can become rampant. 
A recent in-depth qualitative and quantitative assessment of the Costa Rican drug 
system’s registration, selection, procurement, distribution, and service delivery revealed 
both strengths and weaknesses.
12 Clear publicly available procedures, essential drugs 
lists and drug criteria; reliance on defined, generic drugs; and distribution audits were 
deemed excellent. The greatest weaknesses were in procurement, specifically in the lack 
of performance monitoring, quality control, audits and uncontrolled political 
interference. In distribution, inventory management, security and information systems 
were found particularly deficient. Half of exit survey respondents had not received a 
prescribed drug due to non-availability, an important indicator of ineffectiveness 
(Cohen 2002). Costa Rica’s strong record in health care delivery and its relatively 
higher income, greater health spending and education levels among developing 
countries suggests the difficulty and challenges inherent in managing public health 
systems and drugs in particular. 
Procurement of drugs and medical supplies 
Countries with weak institutions face serious challenges when it comes to procurement 
of medical supplies, drugs, and equipment. The public procurement process is unique in 
that (1) private sector participants who are stakeholders in the outcome of the process 
are directly involved; (2) large, discrete amounts of public expenditure are involved; 
and (3) it entails significant discretion on part of public officials (PEFA Secretariat 
2005). In such contexts, the absence of a clearly regulated procurement process, 
incentives for performance, accountability, adequate monitoring and oversight, and 
controls, the opportunity for procurement fraud is exacerbated (Ware et al. 2007). 
Procurement and logistics for medicines and specialized supplies in the health sector are 
different in several respects from goods procurement in other sectors due to the 
difficulty of assessing the quality of drugs provided, the need for coordination between 
procurement processes and regulatory processes, the wide range of prices observed in 
the private sector for products with the same active pharmaceutical ingredient, the need 
to manage expiration dates and technically stringent storage conditions in the 
distribution chain, and the challenge of ensuring supplies in the face of unpredictable 
demand for products due to health care emergency situations to name but a few (Cohen 
et al. 2007). Inability to handle these factors results in system inefficiencies as 
manifested in failed bidding, non-competitive bidding, overstocking and stock-outs, and 
waste of date-expired or damaged product in public sector supply chains. As 
competitive bidding is a more protracted process than direct contracting, there is a 
tendency for government agencies to choose the latter option, using “emergency need” 
for medicines as a rationale. In addition, health goods procurement is susceptible to 
many of the same risks as other sectors among them collusion, bid-rigging, biased 
technical specifications, shaving of quantities delivered, and leakage in the distribution 
chain.  
                                                            
12 The study used a combination of (i) interviews with public officials; (ii) industry interviews with local 
pharmacies and multinational companies; (iii) focus groups with health care professionals; and (iv) exit 
surveys for a representative sample of patients (Lewis 2006).  
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A striking case of the scope for non-transparent and anti-competitive behavior in health 
goods procurement is documented in the Bank’s Direct Implementation Review of five 
health projects in India (India DIR) conducted in 2007. Inappropriate handling of 
procurement such as last-minute changes to contract provisions accepted from certain 
bidders; contract specifications altered to enable a certain bidder to win the award; 
alerting of certain bidders of impending bids prior to the advertising period; rejection of 
all lowest-price bidders rejected; kickback negotiations; and decisions made about 
bidders with lack of supporting documents (WB Department of Institutional Integrity 
2007). 
To detect and address procurement irregularities a transparent and established process, 
hard indicators, oversight, and accountability for performance are crucial. A study of 
procurement irregularities in hospital payments for selected homogeneous inputs in four 
countries in Latin America provides a stark illustration. The ratio of the highest to 
lowest prices paid was 15 to 1 for saline and 36 to 1 for cotton (Figure 5) (Gray-Molina, 
Pérez de Rada, and Yañez 2001) While overpayment may result from incompetence, 
this example of extreme wastage in procurement is explainable only by either gross 
mismanagement or corruption (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). In Ghana interviews with 
officials and the public suggested that 21 percent of procurements in government 
hospitals were corrupt, and that 18 percent of the value of contracts was required in 
kickbacks to public officials (World Bank 2000). 
 
FIGURE 5. MEDICAL SUPPLY PRICE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS HOSPITALS IN 
FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1997–1998 
 
Results from surveys of physicians and nurses in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela 
indicate that corruption within facilities leads to overpayment of suppliers, and that the 















































Source: Di Tella and Savedoff (2001). 
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(Schargrodsky, Mera, and Weinschelbaum 2001; Giedion, Morales and Acosta 2001; 
Jaén and Paravisini 2001). In short, the lack of enforced rules, procedures, and 
accountability effectively allows irregularities in purchasing practices. 
 
Potential solutions 
Between inputs and outputs, and between outputs and outcomes, are the institutional 
and public sector actions that define performance. The budget and resource 
management solutions aimed at improving governance and thereby health sector 
performance listed below vary in scope and design but all share common elements: the 
need to put in place effective incentives, increase oversight, and introduce 
accountability mechanisms. 
Performance based budgeting 
One potential way to address poor governance in public financial management is 
performance based budgeting (PBB), which links allocated funds to measurable outputs 
and/or outcomes to improve resource allocation and resource-use efficiency to enhance 
the quality of public expenditures and, ultimately, the quality of public service provision 
(OECD 2007; World Bank 2008). Two main characteristics set PBB apart from 
traditional budgeting systems: “the greater focus on the achievement of public program 
objectives and their alignment with government policies” and “an emphasis on holding 
senior officials accountable for deliverables – often with an accompanying change in 
the nature of expenditure controls, away from detailed ‘line item’ input controls to one 
where managers are held accountable for both results and the use of inputs” (World 
Bank 2008: 6). For PBB to translate into good governance, sufficient technical and 
administrative capacity, accurate information on performance, and the means to hold 
officials and providers accountable must exist.  Brazil’s state of Minas Gerais has 
launched a government-wide initiative, Shock Gestao, that includes performance 
tracking of the secretary of health and initial indications are that it is raising the bar on 
performance. 
Building financial management capacity 
Ensuring basic capacity in public health sector agencies’ financial management systems 
is fundamental to prevent and control budget execution failures. The effectiveness of 
audit, for example, may be compromised by poor primary record-keeping. In Ghana and 
Mozambique, provincial health departments were able to provide district-level data for 
less than half of their districts (Lindelow, Kushnarova, and Kaiser 2006). Financial 
management staff and systems need to be functional at all stages of the budget cycle 
and for this to be feasible down to district and clinic level, simplification and 
streamlining of financial and other reporting requirements is vital.   
Increasing internal transparency: information and its systematic application 
Internal transparency, which ensures that information and data are recorded accurately 
and on a regular basis, and that they are available to decision makers on demand, is a 
vital component of good governance in budget processes as it permits more effective 
detection of irregularities in the budget process. To strengthen internal transparency  
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requires improved accuracy, timeliness, and distribution of financial information to 
relevant stakeholders (e.g. policymakers, local officials, and citizens depending on the 
sensitivity of the information), which typically requires the creation of effective 
information management systems, training of staff in their application and use, and, 
crucially, the design and introduction of incentives for regular data collection, 
maintenance, and use without which providers are unlikely to collect and use 
performance information. 
Improving internal control: oversight, audits, and simplification  
Management control and oversight are necessary to implement financial and budget 
rules, establish civil servant accountability, and improve performance. Audits can detect 
a range of financial irregularities and provide information on means to rectify problems 
when incentives to follow up and respond to audit findings are in place. To help 
minimize the time and cost of audits, health and finance ministries can undertake record 
simplification and procedural streamlining. Improved oversight, follow through on 
recommendations, and institutionalization of audit procedures can promote progress in 
these areas. 
Payroll cleanup and management 
Regular updating of employee lists and payroll commitments is a basic management 
tool and is a high priority for health systems, which have large numbers of employees. 
While politically difficult and not inexpensive, accurate, up-to-date employee records 
are a critical starting point for improving human resource management and reducing 
payroll irregularities. Physical verification where teams visit points of pay and verify 
that physicians and nurses on payroll exist and are being paid the correct salary can be 
carried out. A less costly method is to have auditors carry out spot checks at health 
facilities to verify that workers on payroll actually exist. 
Tracking the flow of funds and supplies 
PERs and PETs in the health sector provide information on where budget leakages take 
place during the flow of funds. Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys (QSDS) examine 
the efficiency of public spending and incentives, and various dimensions of services 
delivery, especially at the level of the service facility, and can be useful complements to 
PERs and PETS, providing further information on areas that are prone to leakage, and 
why.
13 Once the main governance weaknesses contributing to leakages have been 
identified priority actions can be outlined. For instance, health PETS for Chad and 
Ghana determined that leakages were most likely to occur between the central and 
regional/district levels (Savedoff 2008). 
Outsourcing disbursement of funds to independent third-party 
Contracting out disbursements to an independent third-party can complement 
government efforts, and are particularly useful in fragile states with little existing 
capacity to ensure that public funds reach their destination. In general, contracting out 
                                                            
13 For a brief, useful overview of QSDS see http://poverty2.forumone.com/files/14546_30_QSDS.pdf  
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should be a temporary strategy until public financial management systems have been 
sufficiently strengthened.   
Making prices transparent to reduce procurement fraud 
By regularly monitoring prices of common goods and holding purchasing managers 
accountable if prices substantially differ from those of other hospitals or benchmark 
prices, procurement fraud can be discouraged. When the government of Argentina 
introduced monitoring of prices hospitals paid for medical supplies there was wide 
dispersion in prices. For goods on the monitored price list, prices fell by an average of 
12 percent over the first few months of the program. But benefits were not sustained as 
hospital managers realized that the program was based purely on moral suasion with no 
tangible sanctions, and subsequently, they reverted to their previous practices (Savedoff 
2008; Schargrodsky, Mera, and Weinschelbaum 2001). In Colombia price variations of 
medical supplies were statistically significant across purchases of public hospitals, 
particularly where hospitals ignored the price lists negotiated and endorsed by a local 
NGO under contract to the government and estimates indicated that 11 percent of costs 
could have been saved if accepted public tendering rules had been followed (Giedion, 
Morales, and Acosta 2001). 
Using e-procurement to improve efficiency and discourage corruption 
Electronic government procurement (e-GP) can increase transparency and 
accountability in health procurement thereby improving resource management and 
reducing opportunities for fraud, ultimately, leading to lower prices. One example of e-
GP in health procurement is Chile, which created an electronic bidding system to 
oversee pharmaceutical procurement and used the internet for information 
dissemination at all stages of the procurement process. The system helped reduce 
collusion by ensuring a competitive bidding process, which reduced the incentives for 
corruption, and by making drug prices transparent to all bidders and purchasers 
resulting in cost savings (Cohen and Montoya 2001). In addition, through ChileCompra 
Express all public hospitals have access to a range of services from private providers, 
which can be chosen according to price or distance and has helped improve supply and 
hospital management (GOC 2007).  In Brazil the federal health ministry has an online 
price database (Banco de Pecos em Saude) that records recent prices paid to suppliers 
for many medical inputs, and a complementary online bidding system (Pregao 
Eletronico) that permits e-bidding on public contracts, which together make transactions 
transparent and avoids possible charges of irregularity in purchasing of health inputs La 
Forgia and Couttolenc 2009). 
Autonomy and organization of central medical stores and drug revolving funds 
The level of autonomy and organization of Central Medical Stores (CMS) and Drug 
Revolving Funds (DFR) affects the ability to provide a rapid, responsive drug supply to 
local health facilities. Under the Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) 
six Nigerian states undertook reform of CMS and DRFs combined with measures to 
strengthen capacity and internal financial management and control systems. The 
organizational reform also strengthened accountability through stronger community 
oversight of the CMS and DRFs with community representatives on the Health Facility  
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Committee (HFC) having signing power on expenditures. Under the new system the 
availability of drugs improved, drugs were provided at lower prices than in the private 
sector, and some instances of the HFC holding health staff accountable for 
misappropriating DRF funds (PATHS 2008). 
Separation of duties and staff in warehouses 
One South African distribution agency introduced strict separation of duties and staff in 
their drug warehouses in order to reduce corruption opportunities. Order fulfillment, 
checking, and transport were assigned to different staff, and staff working in each area 
only had access to the information they require to do their particular tasks, work in 
different parts of the warehouses, and even have different break times to reduce the 
scope for collusion. This approach has successfully created barriers to corruption (Vian 
2006).  
Harnessing technology and transparency for effective inventory management 
Use of technology and integration of information systems for procurement and 
inventory management can strengthen internal controls. Inventory reporting and 
ordering from peripheral health facilities can be facilitated by SMS-based (text 
messaging) reporting forms, which can improve data accuracy and timeliness. Some 
countries such as Chile have established IT-supported pharmaceuticals management 
services that use the same types of technology as the private sector to permit more 
flexible electronic ordering by health facilities and shorter delivery times (Cohen and 
Montoya 2001). 
External accountability through citizen participation 
In Bolivia, citizen participation on health boards was found to lead to significant 
reductions in overpayment for drugs by procurement units (Gray-Molina, Perez de 
Rada, and Yáñez 2001). “Local Health Directorates”, which included local government 
officials and citizen representatives, were established to oversee most health care 
facilities. Price data collected for various supplies found that hospitals that were 
supervised by active directorates paid less on average than hospitals that had 
directorates with less active citizen participation. For instance, hospitals that were 
supervised by active directorates paid 40 percent less on average for 5 percent dextrose 
solution (Savedoff 2008). In this case, local supervision combined with citizen vigilance 
was instrumental to better performance. However, in Pakistan, some districts introduced 
monitoring by citizen committees after decentralization, which improved availability of 
medicines. However, the initiative occurred in urban locations with relatively well 
educated citizens, and was not replicated more widely (World Bank 2004b). These 
voice initiatives may be less effective than models for community participation which 
give community representatives real power to make decisions and hold providers 
accountable for their performance as in the case of Nigeria’s health facility committees 




Using the private sector 
Some countries, e.g. Tanzania, Ghana, and Zambia, have attempted to privatize their 
central medical stores functions or contract private sector firms to act as procurement 
and logistics agents for public health facilities. Results have been mixed. Countries with 
weak systems for contract management may actually reduce accountability when they 
contract out. In countries with pervasive poor governance, the contracting-out process 
itself is vulnerable to corruption. Some countries, for example, Senegal have established 
partnerships between government’s procurement service and a private logistics firm to 
provide this type of service. Other countries, Guatemala for drugs and Indonesia for 
vaccines, arrange for private sector suppliers to take responsibility for delivering 
publicly procured products directly to districts or facilities on an agreed schedule 
(Barillas 2005).  
Social pharmacies and private distribution 
Governments in some countries, for example Guatemala and Uganda where contracted 
non-profit organizations are providing health services, also allow these to operate retail 
pharmacy outlets selling lower priced medicines (Barillas 2005). In some countries, 
NGOs have their own procurement and distribution arrangements. In the Philippines, 
social franchising of non-profit pharmacies to increase the number of outlets selling 
generic medicines at low cost has proved effective. 
 
 
4. Individual Provider Performance  
Provider performance is tied to the incentives and accountability arrangements faced by 
health workers. When hired and paid centrally but assigned locally, health workers’ 
lines of reporting and accountability become opaque as does managerial authority. 
Under such circumstances, the incentives and accountability for performance are 
unclear (Box 1). Where accountability is not clear there will in effect not be any 
accountability, and public health workers find themselves in asituation that inhibits their 
performance and negatively affects service access and quality (Figure 1).  In addition, 
performance benchmarks are frequently undefined and management information on 
even simple things such as attendance are lacking. Where such a cycle of minimal 
information, conflicting incentives, and absent accountability exists it is unlikely that 
services will be delivered with the efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness 
intended. 
Given the importance of human resources for health care delivery and the singular lack 
of attention to basic elements for managing, tracking and rewarding health worker 
performance it is not surprising that medical care staffing has emerged as a serious issue 
in development (Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009).  But can translate into abuses, 
corruption and poor performance. 
The public sector health workforce represents the largest single group of civil servants 
in most countries, and as a result, the health sector claims a significant proportion of 
national budgets. Because health care production is highly labor intensive, human 
resource management and the performance of health workers largely define the scope  
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and quality of health service delivery. How public sector health workers are recruited, 
deployed, monitored, and perform is critical to health care delivery performance and 
governed by underlying health system incentives and lines of accountability. Hard 
evidence on these topics is scarce; most of the available measures of performance are 
negative and include indicators such as absenteeism and reliance on bribery or personal 
contacts to obtain jobs and promotions. This section outlines the main governance 
issues and potential performance indicators, and examines existing evidence and 
possible solutions to the persistent challenges facing human resource management in 
health. 
Designing recruitment and assignment to improve performance 
Civil service regulations and recruitment systems are intended to ensure a professional, 
politically neutral workforce with appointment and promotion based on transparent civil 
service regulations and pay scales. With those advantages can come disincentives for 
performance including compression of pay differentials that make rewards minimal, 
promotion based on seniority rather than performance, lack of mechanisms to monitor 
effort, and limited or no freedom of managers to reward and discipline staff. Civil 
service reforms can address some of these limitations but pose political and operational 
difficulties.   
Physician and nurse performance can be enhanced through (1) policies that promote the 
recruitment, hiring, transfer, and assignment of adequately trained staff; (2) appropriate 
incentives; and (3) effective accountability mechanisms. While it is relatively simple to 
outline the processes, implementation is complex. Without consideration of these 
components human resource management becomes susceptible to some combination of 
political manipulation, mismanagement, nepotism/favoritism, and fraud, which can 
compromise performance.  
To ensure hiring of qualified health workers and their continued technical effectiveness 
typically requires that physicians and nurses obtain their medical or nursing degrees 
from accredited institutions. Also important are licensing exams, which assure that upon 
graduation a physician or nurse “has successfully completed an appropriate sequence of 
medical education…and has demonstrated competence through successful completion 
of an examination or other certification demonstrating qualification for licensure”.
14 
Requirements for continuing education and re-licensing may also exist, and in many 
cases also complaint mechanisms for reporting medical malpractice. Often such quality 
safeguards are absent in developing and transition countries; medical and nursing 
school accreditation is rare, licensing absent, and continuing education unavailable or 
only sporadically so, all of which make managing human resource for performance a 
serious challenge.  
Armenia, for instance, has licensing procedures to ensure that physicians and nurses are 
adequately qualified and possess legitimate qualifications but health workers reported 
that a license could easily be obtained through bribery or contacts (Kurkchiyan 1999). 
Complaint mechanisms when they exist are only effective if patients actually make 
complaints and these are followed up by providers. Household survey data from 
                                                            
14 See the American Medical Association website at http://www.ama-assn.org/aps/physcred.html#license.  
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Thailand showed that out of nearly 10,000 hospital patients, 1.7 percent made a formal 
complaint, however, 3.4 percent of patients reported not making a complaint since it 
“would take too long” and 22.8 percent because it was “no use” (Phongpaichit et al. 
2000). These examples illustrate that simply having procedures in place is not enough.  
Hiring and Assignment: The Challenges of Favoritism, Nepotism, and Purchasing of 
Posts 
Favoritism is the illegal preference given to any person while nepotism is the illegal 
preference given to a relative (Hallak and Poisson 2007). Nepotism typically does not 
involve bribery, favoritism sometimes does, whereas purchasing of posts always does. 
In the latter case, a physician may, for example, pay an official to be hired, or for a 
preferred assignment (e.g. urban rather than rural). Hiring and appointments are 
susceptible to both types of practices when the recruitment process is not transparent, 
rules are not made public or are ignored, and there are no credible sanctions for 
inappropriate behavior of the “sellers” or “buyers” of the post. Moreover, accurate and 
timely information to enable effective oversight over decision-making in human 
resource management is often lacking in developing and transition countries. 
Bribes can play a key part in the selection process. In some countries, physician posts 
can be “bought” from health facility committees or board members. As a consequence, 
physician recruitment and selection processes come to hinge on the ability and 
willingness to pay for positions rather than on objective criteria. It may also lead to 
newly hired physicians requiring fees from patients to recoup their payment for the 
position. As long as recruitment criteria are unclear or systematically bypassed, and 
there are no oversight mechanisms in place, there is a risk that unqualified physicians, 
nurses, and health administrators can be appointed. If no one is accountable for the 
quality of staff hired, health worker performance and health service delivery both tend 
to suffer. 
There are numerous anecdotal reports on favoritism and nepotism in hiring in the health 
sector but rigorous evidence is scarce. In Namibia, favoritism in the handling of health 
human resource management as measured by health workers’ perceptions was reported 
by some managers (Iipinge et al. 2006). Health worker interviews and focus groups in 
Benin and Kenya revealed low motivation due to slow and non-transparent promotion 
processes (Mathauer and Imhoff 2006). In focus groups in Ethiopia health officials 
complained about unfair hiring practices, nepotism, and preferential treatment for well-
connected individuals (Lindelöw, Serneels, and Lemma 2005). Similarly, in the 
Dominican Republic “patronage propelled personnel rolls” resulting in one of the 
highest health personnel to population ratios in Latin America with promotions 
routinely relying on recommendations from politicians and military authorities leading 
to a mismatch between skills and needs (La Forgia et al. 2004). 
Ethiopia uses a lottery system to assign newly graduated health workers to their first 
posting and graduates have a contractual obligation to work for the government for a 
specific period of time. The assignments, according to the rules, once determined 
cannot be refused or changed. Evidence from focus groups consisting of final year 
nursing (220) and medical students about to start their internships (80) found that 54 
percent of participants “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the lottery was a fair process,  
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51 percent “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the first public posting depends mainly on 
your contacts, and 56 percent that they could get their posting changed if they were not 
happy with it (Serneels 2008; Lindelöw and Serneels 2006). The fact that such a large 
share of final year students believe that assignment of posts depends primarily on your 
contacts, and can be changed, strongly suggests the existence of nepotism and 
favoritism in the assignment of public sector positions. 
Results from national perceptions surveys suggest that purchasing of posts occurs in 
several countries for which relatively recent data are available (Table 7). The share of 
public officials who reported job purchasing in health as common or very common 
ranged from 9 percent in Benin and 14 percent in Indonesia to 25 percent in Ghana, and 
up to 50 percent in Zambia. 
 
TABLE 7: PUBLIC OFFICIALS’ REPORTS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH HEALTH 
PERSONNEL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY ILLEGAL PAYMENTS, 2000-2006 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 75 percent of officials and citizens reported that bribes 
were required to obtain positions and be promoted in the health sector (World Bank 
2001). Twenty percent of municipal officials in the health sector in Uganda reported 
bribes being paid to secure employment compared to 3 percent in the Philippines 
(Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001).  
Interviews with health workers in Cambodia hint at the magnitude of illegal payments 
for public positions, with higher positions fetching higher prices. A director post at the 
Ministry of Health’s national and provincial offices reportedly cost close to 
US$100,000, whereas lower level positions cost around US$3,000 (Prevenslik-Takeda 








% of public officials' reporting that job purchasing in health is common or very common
Source: World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Surveys (various years). 
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2006).
 15 Given the size of payments, which represent a multiple of an average annual 
wages for public sector employees, these payments constitute a substantial investment 
that the employee must somehow recoup. 
Improving job assignment procedures 
Health workers who do not want to be assigned to remote areas may resort to paying 
informally to be assigned to more attractive locations, or to be transferred out of 
locations. Concerns over not being able to participate in career development programs 
and networking opportunities that help build careers, poor living conditions, language 
barriers, lack of good schools for their children, and possibly risks to health and safety, 
are all important and real factors in health workers’ reluctance to transfer to remote 
areas (Lehmann, Dieleman, and Martineau 2008). 
Job migration, i.e. health workers not working in their assigned location, frequently 
takes the form of migration of posts from rural/primary health care facilities to urban 
areas/hospitals, which generates imbalances in the geographic and skill distributions of 
health staff. Certain types of health systems are more prone to this problem. Where 
staffing systems assign individuals to the central ministry, rather than specific facilities, 
and there is discretion over the geographic distribution of posts, frontline staff may 
lobby to have their posts transferred to more attractive locations leading to overstaffing 
in urban areas and understaffing in rural areas, or inappropriate skill mixes (Dehn, 
Reinikka, and Svensson 2003). 
A Honduras public expenditure review illustrates the problem (World Bank 2001a). In 
this particular case more than 5 percent of surveyed health staff had migrated to posts 
other than those they were initially assigned to as recorded in the central database; 
health promoters and physicians were the most likely to have migrated. Moreover, job 
migration was always lateral or from a lower to a higher level. In addition to the 
geographic imbalance this generated, about 20 percent of staff functions did not 
correspond to the formal education or training of the assigned professional (World Bank 
2001a; Dehn, Reinikka, and Svensson 2003). 
Why and how often are health workers absent? 
Health worker performance relies on their being at work during contracted hours yet 
absenteeism is a chronic although often unmeasured problem in health systems in 
developing and transition countries (Lewis 2006).
16 When it is widespread it can 
severely limit access to and quality of health services, and constitutes fraud when 
absences are unauthorized (Lewis, La Forgia, and Sulvetta 1996; McPake et al. 1999; 
Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). Here, health worker absenteeism is defined as 
unauthorized absences by health workers during contracted hours. 
Health workers who fail to show up for work, arrive late and/or leave early, or do not 
carry out their assigned duties while at the health facility constitute a drag on health 
                                                            
15 The average annual wages of a public sector employee are about US$480 (Prevenslik-Takeda 2006). 
16 Dual practice, when public sector physicians supplement their incomes by working in the private 
sector, is not discussed in this paper. This practice only becomes an issue if it affects the work undertaken 
by the physician in the public sector.   
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resources and have a direct negative impact on health service delivery. One estimate for 
Colombian hospitals put the cost of time lost due to absenteeism at more than US$1 
million per year (Giedion, Morales, and Acosta 2001). The effect of health worker 
absenteeism on the quality of health services is more difficult to assess but is no doubt 
substantial, especially in cases where facilities are staffed by only one provider meaning 
that the when he/she is absent there are no services at all.  
Absenteeism occurs for various reasons, several of which are legitimate or necessary. 
For example, rural health workers often need to travel to larger towns to receive their 
paycheck, or to fetch supplies and drugs (Lewis 2006). However, many health workers 
are absent without authorization, and, in effect, receive wages without providing even 
minimal services. This is a form of corruption.  
Two important factors affecting attendance is the physical state of health facilities and 
the availability of medical supplies and drugs. A World Bank study of health worker 
absenteeism in six countries: Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, and Uganda, 
showed that well-equipped health facilities with better infrastructure had absentee rates 
roughly half those of facilities with poor infrastructure (Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
Low pay per se does not appear to be the reason for the high and endemic physician and 
nurse absenteeism observed in many developing countries. Being a contract health 
worker in Peru is highly correlated with lower absenteeism even though contract 
workers are paid wages just like their civil-service counterparts (Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
Within health facilities, higher paid health workers such as physicians and pharmacists 
tend to be absent more frequently than lower paid clinicians and nurses (World Bank 
2001a; Chaudhury et al. 2006). Because most public health workers are civil servants 
with high job security their incentives to abide by the rules when there is no supervision 
is limited. 
The six-country study on absenteeism discussed above used surprise visits to a random 
sample of health facilities and recorded average absenteeism of 35 percent (Chaudhury 
et al. 2006). Across countries health staff absenteeism ranges from 6 percent in 
Cameroon, to 25 percent in Peru, to 74 percent for physicians in small clinics in 
Bangladesh (Table 8). Observed absenteeism has considerable advantage over 
administrative records as there are no discrepancies or the need to “report” on fellow 
workers (Rogers and Vegas 2008). 
In Honduras the average absentee rate for health workers was 32 percent in 2001, 
although specialists and GPs had by far the highest absentee rate at 48 percent, and the 
most remote facilities saw absentee rates of close to 68 percent (Table 9) (World Bank 
2001a). Findings for other countries also suggest that absenteeism is higher in facilities 
where health workers are less likely to be monitored or held accountable. Moreover, 
patients in poorer and remote communities are ill equipped to oversee public health 
workers as they have neither the authority nor the status nor education to ensure that 
physicians and nurses provide services. 
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TABLE 8. HEALTH WORKER ABSENTEEISM SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1996-2004 
 
















Note: *Santo Domingo Hospital.
Sources: Chaudhury et al. (2006); Chaudhury and Hammer (2005); World Bank (2001); Gauthier (2006); Lewis, La Forgia, and Sulvetta (1996); McPake et al. (1999); 

















TABLE 9. ABSENTEEISM IN HONDURAS BY TYPE OF HEALTH WORKER AND 
FACILITY 
 
Absenteeism is facilitated by weak performance incentives, lack of supervision, and an 
exceedingly low probability of being disciplined. While disciplinary action for health 
worker absences is often included in official regulations, in practice it is extremely rare.  
Motivating health workers to raise their performance  
Many performance problems, including absenteeism, under-performance, and poor 
quality of service, stem from weak governance systems that fail to reward good 
performance and discipline workers who under-perform.  
Health worker performance depends on a combination of skills, knowledge, and level of 
effort, the latter is largely driven by incentives and the degree of accountability in the 
system. Studies from India, Indonesia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Tanzania document 
variations in the quality of medical care using “medical vignettes and patient reports to 
benchmark the quality of medical advice against a checklist of essential procedures 
developed in consultation with doctors” (Das and Hammer 2005: 297). Overall, these 
studies concluded that the quality of health care was poor due to both inadequate 
knowledge and low levels of effort. The former can potentially be addressed through 
better training, the latter through better incentives, oversight, and accountability. 
Table 10 lists non-financial incentives that appear to motivate health workers. The list is 
not exhaustive but illustrates the range of non-financial incentives that can influence 
health worker performance. These incentives are context-specific and should be viewed 
as possible tools to raise performance. 
 
TABLE 10. NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES REPORTED BY HEALTH WORKERS 
IN FOCUS GROUPS 
 
Focus groups and interviews with health workers shed light on the importance of non-
financial incentives in motivating health workers. Health workers in Benin emphasized 
the importance of “the ability to perform one’s work” by having the necessary resources 
combined with training and supervision (Mathauer and Inghoff 2006). A health worker 




National hospital 33 52 26 25
Regional hospital 5 18 19 19
Urban health post 78 28 37 25
Peripheral clinic 80 87 47 61
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2001).
Career development prospects Resource and equipment availability
Continuing education and training Supervisor feedback




study in Zimbabwe found that the top reason given for leaving the public health sector 
was the lack of equipment and medical supplies together with a poor work environment 
(USAID 2003). Similarly, in Ethiopia health workers cited a good work environment 
where drugs and medical supplies necessary to treat patients are available as one of the 
most important factors in raising performance (Lindelöw, Serneels, and Lemma 2005). 
A lack of supervisor feedback and poor management are frequently reported by health 
workers as reasons for under-performance. In a 2007 study of mid-level professionals at 
four rural mission hospitals in Malawi, health workers expressed concern about 
management’s capacity, erratic implementation of policies, and absence of supervision 
(Bradley and McAuliffe 2009). In addition, of those interviewed, only 17 percent had 
written job descriptions but these often did not correspond to actual duties, and staff 
were frequently required to carry out tasks beyond their training and experience. While 
pay levels remained a concern, the lack of physical resources and better management 
were considered much more important for performance.  
Opportunities to advance professionally and receive further education and training also 
emerge as important if sometimes overlooked factors in motivating health workers 
(Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008), however, the evidence is very limited. In Malawi, mid-
level health workers in focus groups reported that one of the major reasons for their low 
performance was the lack of opportunities for career development and further education 
(Bradley and McAuliffe 2009). In a study of Cameroon and Ghana, 5-20 percent of 
skilled public sector health workers cited the main reason for leaving their country as 
the lack of professional training opportunities (Lehmann, Dieleman, and Martineau 
2008). 
The limited available evidence suggests that pay may not be as important a determinant 
of performance as the ability to hold health workers accountable for their performance. 
A study of Venezuelan public hospitals found that higher wages for purchasing 
managers were not associated with less corruption suggesting that higher pay alone does 
not necessarily control corrupt practices (Jaén and Paravisini 2001). Health workers in 
Uganda employed by non-profit, faith-based health facilities succeed in delivering 
higher quality health services than public sector facilities, even though the former pay 
similar, below-market salaries to their staff, and employ staff with similar levels of 
training (Reinikka and Svensson 2007). Evidence for Tanzania, Guatemala, and 
Honduras similarly finds that, on average, health workers in NGO health facilities 
provide better care than those in public sector facilities (Leonard and Masatu 2007; La 
Forgia 2005). Many of the reasons underlying this disparity in performance appear to be 
associated with differences in non-financial incentives, management authority to 
discipline poorly performing health workers, and ability to reward good performance, 
between public and NGO run facilities. Contracting of NGO management services 
dramatically improved quality (e.g. lower infection rates), efficiency, (lower per capita 
cost), and patient satisfaction in a sample of Brazilian hospitals (La Forgia and 
Couttolenc 2008). 
Evidence from vignettes on physician performance from seven neighborhoods in Delhi 
find that physicians do less than what they could given their knowledge; physicians who 
know more do more; and that the gap between physicians’ knowledge and what they do  
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in practice responds to incentives (Das and Hammer 2005).
17 Private sector physicians 
have a smaller gap between what they know and how they perform than public sector 
physicians. Even private sector physicians who know less than their public sector 
counterparts provide better quality care on average. Similar evidence emerges for 
physicians in Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu 2007). 
Indian physicians in large general public hospitals performed nearly as well as private 
sector physicians whereas physicians in smaller clinics performed much worse 
suggesting the importance of incentives in motivating medical providers. Public 
physicians in smaller clinics are paid a fixed salary, are typically not monitored, and do 
not face sanctions for underperformance. In public hospitals providers, although they 
are are also paid a fixed salary , are more likely to be monitored by supervisors, may not 
want to risk losing the prestige associated with working in a large hospital, and typically 
face better career development opportunities. Private sector physicians in turn are paid 
for each service provided and rely on their performance for repeat visits (Das and 
Hammer 2005). 
Even if pay is relatively high health workers may under-perform if professional 
development opportunities are limited and the probability of being penalized is very 
low. Although procedures for disciplining poorly performing health workers exist in 
many countries disciplinary action is a rarity because even when sanctions are 
technically feasible they are often too cumbersome to apply. For instance, in Brazil, 
complaints to the Regional Medical Council can lead to disciplinary measures ranging 
from a warning to dismissal but because it typically takes 4-5 years from the initial 
complaint to resolution and the outcome is uncertain the process is rarely used (World 
Bank 2006). In Kaduna state, Nigeria, the process for disciplining primary health care 
workers is so onerous it has in effect become irrelevant (World Bank 2008).  
 
Potential solutions 
Raising health worker performance requires the introduction of effective incentives, 
means to assess or audit performance, and accountability mechanisms. How to do this 
in practice remains a challenge but some initiatives have shown promise. A review 
study by Willis-Shattuck et al. (2008) suggests that financial incentives matter but have 
to be accompanied by some combination of accountability mechanisms and/or non-
financial incentives such as career development opportunities, a good work 
environment, and availability of resources and equipment as discussed above. 
Transparent recruitment, assignment, and promotion systems 
Recruitment, assignment, and promotion procedures based on clear rules and criteria 
known to all relevant parties tend to reduce the scope for fraudulent practices. Hiring 
and promotion by selection committees is preferable to actions of a single administrator 
since it limits discretion, and improves credibility if they are transparent. Promoting 
transparency and merit in recruitment, assignment, and promotions is politically and 
administratively difficult. In Jordan, strict civil service rules regulate recruitment, 
                                                            
17 Das and Hammer (2005) use vignettes to assess physician competence and direct observation to assess 
the quality of medical advice given; the difference between the two captures effort.  
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selection, and promotions but in practice appointments and promotions are based on 
non-transparent criteria due to the lack of performance assessment.  
Using the private sector to speed up recruitment and deployment 
Where public recruitment systems function poorly the private sector for recruitment can 
sometimes provide a faster and more effective alternative. In Kenya, it currently takes 
1-2 years to fill open public sector positions in the health sector despite the existence of 
a large pool of unemployed health workers. To address this problem a group including 
the MOH, the MOE, and the MOF, was created to put together a fast-track hiring and 
deployment model. Deloitte & Touche Kenya was hired to recruit, deploy, pay, and 
manage the contracts of 830 recruited health workers later to be transferred to 
government payroll. Under this arrangement the recruitment process was reduced to less 
than three months, and, reportedly, retention and satisfaction of workers improved due 
to timely payment of wages and job orientation programs (Adano 2008). Whether a 
scaling up of this type of arrangement would be feasible in all settings is not clear but 
holds promise. 
Reducing job migration through local recruitment 
Local recruitment of health workers can reduce job migration. In Thailand, local 
recruitment and training in rural areas of nurses, midwives, and paramedics, then 
assigned to serve in their home town and only licensed to work in the public sector, 
have been successful in facilitating recruitment to remote areas and have led to 
increased staff retention (Lehmann, Dieleman, and Martineau 2008). Similarly, in 
Indonesia, physicians from remote areas are significantly more willing to serve in 
remote areas according to surveys where physicians chose among hypothetical 
assignments (Chomitz et al. 1998).  
Strengthening accountability to discourage absenteeism 
An example from Venezuela illustrates the importance of accountability for reducing 
absenteeism. Evidence from 22 urban hospitals in three different states in Venezuela 
showed that the higher the perceived probability of detection the lower absenteeism for 
both physicians and nurses, and for nurses a higher probability of penalties for poor 
performance being imposed was associated with lower absenteeism (Jaén and Paravisini 
2001). 
Hiring contract health workers 
A study examining the effect of different institutional arrangements in four Peruvian 
hospitals, three public and one private, found that physicians who had “permanent” 
contracts (civil servants) and enjoyed significant job security had a notably higher 
absentee rate than “contracted” physicians who can be terminated, lending support to 
the importance of accountability for reducing absenteeism and raising performance 
(Alcázar and Andrade 2001). In Ceara, Brazil the state hired primary health care 
outreach workers under contract and handed responsibility for supervision to 
municipalities. Local control and renewable contracts helped reduce absenteeism and 
improve health services (Tendler and Freedheim 1994).  
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Providing opportunities for career development and training 
Availability of training and further education opportunities can create incentives for 
raising health worker performance, and ensures up-to-date technical skills. At the 
Children’s Hospital in Georgia, physician performance rewards in the form of 
opportunities to attend training and seminars, coupled with other rewards: preferred 
hours of work, preferred leave, and publicly-awarded recognition, led to improved 
physician performance (see Table 11 for more information). Data on posting locations 
chosen by recent medical graduates in Indonesia before and after a major change in 
incentives in the form of specialist training for those serving in remote areas, shows that 
physicians are more willing to serve in remote areas if specialist training that allows 
them to keep current is offered (Chomitz et al. 1998). However, such a solution may not 
be cost effective if the skills attained are not relevant to neither current nor future 
professional requirements. 
Using community-based monitoring to improve health service delivery 
Community monitoring of health service providers to improve performance is appealing 
but there is little evidence on its effectiveness, and what exists is mixed at best. A 
randomized trial from Uganda suggests that as community-based monitoring of 
providers expanded, health service delivery improved. Communities started monitoring 
health facilities in nine districts in 2004. “Community contracts” between communities 
and providers were drawn up that defined the requirements for service improvement and 
methods of community monitoring. One year after the start of the monitoring program, 
there were notable increases in utilization, higher infant birth weights, and less under-
five deaths in the treatment communities. The findings suggest that the improvements 
were the result of staff increasing their work effort as captured by lower absentee rates, 
shorter waiting times, and improved examination procedures (Björkman and Svensson 
2007).  
In Bolivia, corruption in local health service provision was lower where local oversight 
groups were active “suggesting that bottom-up accountability can be effective in 
keeping corruption in check” (Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman 2002: 1081). By 
contrast, in Jigawa state in Nigeria, hospital management committees meant to oversee 
and advise hospital managers rarely met, were unclear on their responsibilities, and had 
little involvement with strategic planning, targeting or budget control (World Bank 
2005). Even more serious, in Uganda in ten public facilities with community monitoring 
through representatives on the Health Unit Management Committee (HUMC), the 
average leakage rate for drugs ranged from 40 to 94 percent and high demand drugs 
were unavailable to patients because health workers and HUMC members, the latter 
meant to provide local oversight, expropriated them (McPake et al. 1999).  
A detailed case study from rural Africa provides further evidence on the difficulties 
associated with effective community monitoring. In the study corruption increased as 
village representatives held meetings with district officials in charge of allocating 
project funding to agree on how much to “pay” to get a particular project (Ensminger 
2007). Once the project was allocated to the village the community selected three 
leaders and a committee trained in accounting and community driven-development. The 
leaders were then given access to the fundsand despite strict regulations on their use,  
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there was no monitoring, and villagers were warned that if they raised any concerns the 
village would never receive another project. In the end only 37 percent of total funds 
reached the intended recipients and a large share of the funds was diverted to the three 
project leaders and committee members. The main identified problems at the 
community level were, first, the relatively small pool of potential leaders.  Second, once 
allocated, project villagers had a disincentive to reveal any irregularities since this 
would mean no future investment.  This suggests that to be effective, communities and 
community leaders need authority but, at the same time, they must be overseen and be 
held to account by the citizenry.  
Pay for performance 
An increasingly considered method for potentially raising performance is through 
performance-based pay. However, it faces challenges in finding appropriate measures to 
assess provider performance. Performance pay may also induce physicians to choose 
not to treat risky patients within a payment category or to avoid treatments that do not 
receive bonuses, may undermine intrinsic motivation, and often bonuses become regular 
payments for all providers effectively removing the incentive to perform better (Ellis 
and McKinnon Miller 2007). Despite recent interest and a growing number of initiatives 
adopting pay for performance in developed countries there is scant evidence on its 
effect on health worker performance. Evidence from several pay for performance 
initiatives in the U.S. has proved inconclusive (Dudley and Rosenthal 2006). The UK 
national pay for performance program for physicians had little effect on performance 
but significantly raised physician earnings, an example of the shift from performance-
based pay to simply higher earnings for the majority of physicians (Campbell et al. 
2004). 
Some suggestive evidence from developing countries linking pay for performance to 
health service delivery outcomes is more encouraging but also highlights potential 
pitfalls of pay for performance and the importance of complementary factors in 
promoting stronger performance. Table 11 shows different models implemented at 
various levels – facility, region, and national – for raising individual provider 
performance, several of which include a performance pay component.  
The design of pay for performance is similar across programs, typically, taking the form 
of a bonus paid if certain pre-determined performance benchmarks are met. The 
benchmarks usually involve some mix of the quality of provider performance (e.g. 
measured by vignettes), presence during contracted hours, qualifications, level of 
responsibility, and in several cases, overall facility performance. 
Where individual bonuses are at least partly tied to overall facility performance peer 
pressure may be a factor in performance improvements. In a randomized-trial of 
performance pay in the Philippines, physicians in participating hospitals were required 
to meet pre-defined quality targets if the facility was to receive the bonus for 
distribution among the hospital staff (Solon et al. 2009). Under such an incentive, the 
staff has an incentive to reach targets individually and collectively. In Takeo referral 
hospital in Cambodia individual bonuses also depended on overall facility performance 
generating a form of peer pressure for staff to meet targets. After the bonus initiative  
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was implemented utilization rose with a significant reduction in informal payments 
(Barber, Bonnet, and Bekedam 2004).  
The programs represented in Table 11 (described in detail in Annex 2) suggest that pay 
for performance alone may not be sufficient to raise performance. It may be that some 
form of provider accountability is also required, for instance, through some form of peer 
pressure (e.g. the Philippines), shorter contracts that are not automatically renewed 
(Georgia), or the possibility of being dismissed (e.g. Cambodia). Granting managers the 
flexibility to recruit, promote, dismiss, and provide staff with training stand out as key 
to raising performance in hospitals in Brazil. Non-financial incentives in the form of 
support for training, allowing staff to work preferred hours, and publicly recognizing 
highly performing physicians, contributed to improved performance in Georgia 
It is difficult to determine the role of pay for performance initiatives since the degree of 
accountability for performance also varies across these programs as do non-financial 
incentives. Overall, however, it appears that giving managers the ability to flexibly 
manage human resources, including hiring, promotions, staff mix, and dismissals, 
contributes to improved performance. Also, non-financial incentives such as career 
development and training opportunities also seem to play a role. Scaling up of 
performance-based programs poses difficulties and few rigorous evaluations of pilots or 
scaled-up programs exist. 
Overall, what seems to work across different settings for raising health worker 
performance is some combination of incentives (financial and/or non-financial), 
accountability for performance, and managerial flexibility. Arguably, incentives without 
accountability are not very effective in raising performance, whereas real accountability 
without incentives may be able to do so. Giving facility managers the authority and 
flexibility to use resources efficiently, and providing them with output-based incentives, 
together seem to improve staff and facility performance, the latter which is discussed in 
the next section on institutional provider performance. 
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TABLE 11. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED COUNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE 
 




Physicians and nurses earn bonuses 
for their performance under facility 
bonus program
Evaluation of different reward 
levels and arrangements under 
Plan Nacer program
Suggests that rewards may 




La Forgia and Couttolenc 
(2008)
Professional development; training 
opportunities; facility head sets 
wages; good management 
environment
Staff can be dismissed Comparison of NGO and public 
physicians; monthly performance 
targets reported
HR significantly more productive 
with higher quality performance
Cambodia
(Pereang district)
Soeters and Griffith (2003)
Physicians earn bonus for individual 
performance but also linked to facility 
performance




Barber, Bonnett, and 
Bekedam (2004)
Physicians earn bonus for individual 
performance but also linked to facility 
performance
Individual bonus partly based on 
overall facility performance
Staff can be dismissed for violating 
hospital rules
Monthly performance review of 
staff
Wage plus bonus equivalent to 





Professional development; training 
opportunities; preferred hours of work 
and leave; public recognition
Six month contracts for MDs, renewal 
subject to number of treated patients 
and fee revenue generated
Increased supervision of hospital 
staff; formal prohibition of informal 
charging




Bitrán and Gómez (2005)
Management and all staff on contract Staff can be dismissed Hospital is autonomous and 
privately operated.
Productivity and quality showed 




Solon et al. (2009)
Staff earn bonus based on facility 
performance measured by physician 
performance (vignettes), patient 
satisfaction, and case load




Higher physician case load.
Rwanda
(Butare district)
Messen et al. (2008)
Physician performance bonus from 
facility fee revenue
Bonus cuts for poor performance
Staff can be dismissed for violating 
facility rules
Audit and close supervision Increase in individual productivity
Tanzania
(Arusha region)
Leonard, Masatu, and 
Vialou (2005)
Facility head sets wages Staff can be dismissed NGO physicians with similar ability 
perform better, on average, than 
public sector physicians (vignettes 
and direct observation) 
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5. Health Facility Performance 
Facilities are as important to health care delivery as staffing. Hospitals tend to absorb a 
disproportionate amount of health care budgets. Despite the funding levels hospitals are 
frequently poorly managed, and little if any evidence on performance is available.  
Indeed hospitals and clinics are often “black boxes” due to the lack of information on 
performance and patient outcomes. Reliance on inputs to ascertain hospital efficiency 
and performance is not enough. Incentives for performance, lack of benchmarks and 
performance criteria coupled with little or no authority and accountability further 
exacerbate the problem (Box 1). As with individual providers, the basic management 
tools (management information systems, ability to discipline staff, flexibility in 
purchasing of inputs) are typically absent, undermining the ability of facilities to meet 
intended and desirable service quality and health outcomes (Figure 1). 
Existing evidence suggest that finding alternative models that incorporate elements of 
the four components in Box 1 can help to raise performance. Little work has been 
undertaken on hospital performance and as a result evidence is highly limited and in 
some cases dated. A few studies have addressed the issue, such as Di Tella and 
Savedoff (2001) and Lewis, La Forgia, and Sulvetta (1991, 1996), both of which 
highlight some of the serious governance and corruption problems in public hospitals in 
Latin America. La Forgia and Couttolenc (2008) and McKee and Healy (2002) discuss 
some of the key accountability issues in hospital performance.    
The extent of absenteeism, overpayment for basic supplies, poor resource use, and 
outright theft are detailed for selected countries and hospitals in Di Tella and Savedoff 
(2001) and Lewis, La Forgia, and Sulvetta (1991, 1996). In a Dominican hospital 
physicians only complied with 12 percent of their contracted time, interns were virtually 
unsupervised in the outpatient department, and the hospital budget was more than 50 
percent higher than costs (based on actual expenditures). In seven countries, hospital 
data and focus groups summarized the lack of accountability health workers faced for 
absenteeism, petty theft, and large variations in prices paid for identical goods across 
national hospitals (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). In all countries, the incentives faced by 
and limited authority of managers undermined the ability to improve quality and 
efficiency of hospital care, which together compromised performance. Evidence was 
pieced together from surveys and available administrative data and provides an 
incomplete but disturbing picture of hospital operations. 
Limited incentives, restricted authority, lack of effective management information 
systems (MIS), ineffective payment arrangements, and managerial challenges combine 
to undermine health care delivery at the hospital level in many countries. In addition, 
the complexity of hospitals makes efficiency and performance hard to both measure and 
track. Since hospitals are usually either public, or publicly financed, political 
interference further complicates the situation. However, as the centers of health care 
delivery and clinical excellence, hospitals are central to raising overall health care 
performance. 
Payments systems in health 
How hospitals and clinics are paid offers a potentially powerful incentive for providers 
to improve targeting, quality, and efficiency of health care delivery. This section  
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focuses on how to raise performance at the facility level. Pay for performance for 
individual health workers is addressed in the section on human resources. The next 
section briefly reviews what is known about payment systems in the health sector and 
their relevance to developing and transition countries before discussing selected country 
experiences with programs aimed at raising institutional provider performance. 
A range of payment systems are used to pay hospitals and clinics, the major payment 
arrangements are summarized in Table 12 and compares the relative effectiveness of 
payment mechanisms in achieving broad health care system objectives. These 
objectives reflect the tensions within health care systems among equity, service delivery 
efficiency, patient satisfaction, and cost containment. 
Most developing transition countries rely on global or line-item budgets based on 
historical allocations without authority to effectively manage resources. Global budgets 
are lump-sum allocations to hospitals and do not provide incentives to increase 
efficiency, or improve patient satisfaction, nor does it address equity. Global budgets 
effectively ration spending because they set a ceiling on resources.
18 Line-item budgets 
restrict hospital spending to specific categories, which limits managers’ abilities to 
allocate funds where needed and can undermine efficiency. 
Per diem systems simply allow hospital to charge or recoup the amounts spent per 
patient per day, which rewards facilities for the volume of patient care without regard to 
diagnosis. It can also encourage long lengths of hospital stay, which raises revenues 
since the first two days of hospital stays are, on average, the most costly. Such 
payments rarely exist on their own rather they are combined with other forms of 
hospital payment. Capitation provides a fixed allocation per capita for a defined set of 
services over a given period of time, sometimes adjusted for gender and age. Both 
arrangements tend to encourage selection of low risk patients and limit access to 
expensive care, and capitation is an effective way to contain costs. 
Prospective payments (also known as case-based payments) introduce incentives for 
increased efficiency and cost control, and provide the greatest equity because for any 
given patient presenting with a specific diagnosis payment is pre-determined. Hospitals 
therefore have an incentive to treat patients and discharge them as soon as feasible 
while ensuring they are well enough to fully recover outside the hospital because if 
patients return, the hospital must treat them within the same budget envelope. 
Patient satisfaction is typically greatest under fee-for-service systems as paying 
customers receive attention and priority, though this system is highly inequitable and 
leads to cost escalation since there are fewer limits to service volume or costs. 
 
                                                            
18 It can, however, lead to high hospital debt levels due to purchasing without the resources to pay 
suppliers. Hospitals then either have a debt overhang or are bailed out by the government, the latter which 
may lead to moral hazard problems.  
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TABLE 12. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE 
INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY ALTERNATIVE HOSPITAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
 
The value of prospective payments systems as a tool for improving performance is 
probably best illustrated by the fact that some form of it is used across the OECD 
countries; one of the few commonalities across those countries in health care. While 
often complex, simplified forms of prospective payments have been effectively adopted 
by Brazil , Chile, and some Eastern European countries, and the results suggest that 
financial  incentives can alter behavior and raise performance in developing and 
transition countries. Although the approach is not always viable, it nonetheless points to 
the importance of payments systems in providing effective incentives. The strong 
incentives and the opportunity for accountability are built into prospective payment 
systems, partly because they must track performance and spending, suggest that 
prospective payments should be part of the dialogue on health systems and on reform 
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No incentives for 
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Similar to global 





Facility paid a 




Fixed fee paid 
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++++ +++ + +++
Promotes efficiency 
thorugh lump sum 
payments for all 








-+ + + + + + -
Providers have 
incentive to provide 
unnecessary 
services to please 
patients
Note: Scale is – to ++++.
Source: Authors based on Lagenbrunner and Wiley (2002).
Payment system objectives 
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Potential solutions 
Raising facility performance entails finding ways to design and implement incentives 
that result in desirable behaviors. In most public health systems, hospital and clinic 
managers have little or no authority over inputs, procurement processes, human 
resources, or the range of outputs. Personnel decisions, re-allocation of resources within 
the budget, capital investments, and larger procurements are often carried out by central 
administrators and budgets are supplemented by in-kind allocation of medical supplies, 
equipment and drugs. In any case, managers are often senior medical staff with little 
training or expertise in management. 
Health facility managers are responsible for their institution’s response to the incentives 
it faces. But many public hospital and clinic managers have little or no authority over 
inputs, procurement processes, human resources, or the range of outputs. Personnel 
decisions, re-allocation of resources within the budget, capital investments, and larger 
procurement decisions are often outside management’s control. Moreover, in some 
developing countries, managers are medical staff without any management training or 
experience, and appointment and promotion through the management hierarchy is based 
on seniority without regard to aptitude or skill for management. 
A number of countries have experimented with different kinds of facility-based 
initiatives that entail some combination of flexible human resource management, 
greater management autonomy, and budget and spending flexibility. The outlines of 
these initiatives, the embedded incentives and accountability mechanisms, and results 
are summarized in Table 13. In the eight cases shown, health facilities receive all or part 
of their funding according to whether they have reached predetermined benchmarks. 
These benchmarks encompass process measures–quality of care, efficiency, quality of 
information, and patient satisfaction–and/or intermediate and final outcome measures–
birth weight, vaccination coverage, number of antenatal care visits, availability of 
modern family planning methods, births attended by skilled personnel, bed occupancy 
rates, ALOS and so on depending on the program. Payments are then made if the targets 
for the selected indicators are met. The advantage of the approach is that there are both 
data and benchmarks that track progress and provide an independent basis for assessing 
quality and productivity. 
The performance initiatives run the gamut encompassing national (Argentina), regional 
(e.g. Cambodia and Uganda), state (Brazil), sub-regional (Philippines) and facility level 
(Cambodia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Panama) programs. All the performance payment 
programs are complemented by other elements that foster performance improvements, 
such as flexibility in human resource management (Cambodia, Brazil, Panama and 
Guatemala), expenditure authority (Cambodia, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Haiti, and Uganda), 
supervision and auditing (Rwanda and Brazil), and facility autonomy (Panama and 
Brazil). Moreover, several of the programs also allowed contract termination for 
physicians (Brazil, Cambodia, Georgia, Panama, and Tanzania). The question is 
therefore how much marginal value pay for performance adds if the ultimate 
accountability is whether physicians keep their positions or not if they do not perform to 
defined standards. This is an important consideration in determining how best to 
motivate staff discussed further below.  
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The results from these select studies suggest that performance incentives targeted at 
facilities can (i) improve performance in terms of increasing access both in general and 
of targeted disadvantaged groups and by raising physician productivity; (ii) improve 
quality of care in hospitals (e.g. more frequent prenatal care and deliveries, lower 
infection rates, and shorter average lengths of stay) and clinics (improve immunization 
coverage, prenatal care and family planning dissemination); (iii) allow NGOs to be 
contracted to improve service delivery. 
The fact that facility-level incentives can work is encouraging. Indeed, in cross-country 
comparisons they appear more stable in some sense than individual incentives, which 
often falter or become permanent wage supplements as is the case in the UK (Campbell 
et al. 2004). More funding along with other reforms can be important to facility 
performance, as seen in Rwanda, Uganda and Cambodia, and facility pay for 
performance alone does not always improve performance as was the case in Uganda 
(Lundberg 2008). The small contribution of individual pay for performance in Rwanda 
suggests that there may exist a threshold below which incentive payments are not 
sufficient to increase health worker effort. The biggest effect in the roll out of the 
Rwanda health reform came from additional funding and more systematic oversight and 
auditing. The bonus payments generated by the institutional provider had a made a 
modest contribution to performance (Gertler et al. forthcoming). 
The ability of managers to flexibly manage human resources and freely allocate 
spending to meet performance targets, combined in most cases with some type of 
monitoring, seems to contribute to stronger facility performance across the various 
models in Table 13.  One exception is Uganda where health facilities in the groups 
receiving a block grant plus performance pay did no better according to the measured 
outcomes than facilities that only received the block grant or did not participate in the 
program (Lundberg 2008). This program although it granted managers some spending 
flexibility made no provisions for holding providers accountable. At the other end of the 
spectrum, in Brazil, management of 12 public hospitals was contracted out using 
renewable contracts and if targets were not met contracts could be (and were) 
terminated along with the hospital director being dismissed, making managers directly 
accountable for performance, and as a result, performance improved dramatically (La 
Forgia 2009). 
Where financial incentives at facility-level are combined with performance pay for 
individuals reinforcing effects may be at work (Table 11, Table 13, and Annex 2). In 
Argentina, the Philippines, and Cambodia, physician rewards were tied to both 
individual and collective performance which meant that managerial attention and peer 
pressure arguably augmented the performance response of individuals.
19  
Overall, based on the admittedly scattered evidence presented above, some combination 
of performance-based financing, spending flexibility, freedom to manage human 
resources, and in some cases, facility autonomy appears to raise institutional provider 
performance. However, more rigorous evidence on what works is necessary to gain a 
clear picture of which factors are merely necessary and which are sufficient. 
                                                            
19 The Argentina results are still preliminary, the evaluation will be available at the end of 2009 but the 
early evidence is encouraging.  
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TABLE 13. RAISING FACILITY PERFORMANCE: EXPERIENCES FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 





Health facilities before and 
after
Baeza (2008)
°Monthly capitation payment per eligible enrollee 
paid to mostly public hospitals in participating 
provinces in two stages:
   -60% of capitation received upon monthly 
verification of enrollment
   -Up to 40% received quarterly, audited ex-post
°Ten indicators related to IMR and MMR:
   -Intermediary outcome indicators (e.g. birth 
weight>=2.5 kg)
   -Output indicators (e.g. 1-year olds with 
completed measles vaccination)
   -Quality of care indicators (e.g. pregnant women 
receiving tetanus vaccination)
°MOH and provinces agree on quarterly targets 
annually and publish these on MOH website
°Decrease in IMR
°Increase in Apgar scores
°Rise in prenatal visits
°Some provinces adapted 
program
Brazil
State of São Paulo
12 public autonomously 
managed (OSS) hospitals 
vs. 12 traditional hospitals
La Forgia and Couttolenc 
(2008)
°Global budget allocated in monthly cash 
installments
°Retention fund: 10% of financing retained if 
comply with quarterly performance targets in four 
areas:
   -Quality of information
   -Efficiency
   -Quality of care
   -Patient satisfaction







°5-year renewable performance-based 
managment contracts with NGOs
°NGO management accountable for operations 
and overall performance
°Regular performance audits by state agency
°Higher quality:
   -Lower general and surgical mortality
   -Lower infection rate
°Higher efficiency:
   -Bed turnover rates
   -Bed substitution rates
   -Bed occupancy rates
   -Average length of stay
   -ALOS for surgery
   -Discharge per bed (general, surgical, clinical, 
and OBGYN)
   -Physician hours






Public hospitals and 
health centers before and 
after contrated out to 
NGO
Soeters and Griffiths 
(2003)
°Managers determine staff incentive payments
°Monthly and quarterly payments to facilities 
based on indicators
°Performance indicators:
   -Good quality (e.g. hygiene and sterilization 
practices)
   -Patient satisfaction (e.g. no overcharging and 
perceptions of quality)
   -No fraud (e.g. no ghost patients)
°Hire and fire staff
°Allocate recurrent expenditures
°Monitoring of performance indicators done by 
indpendent party
°Increase in utilization
°Increase in institutional deliveries
°Rise in fully immunized children
°Increase in children receiving ORS
°Increase in women accepting modern family 
planning
°Rise in user fee revenues
°Health facilities signed 
contracts with NGO 
management in addition to 
individual-level contracts.
°In early phase 1 NGO 
management signed 
contracts only with 
individual workers. This 
failed. 
Guatemala
NGO facilities and public 
facilities managed by 
NGOs vs. traditional 
public facilities
Danel and La Forgia 
(2005)
°Capitation for a package of basic services (PBS)
°Covers cost of basic service and administrative 
expenses
°Traditional public facilities have line-item budgets
°Public NGO-managed facilities hire additional 
staff to complement their existing public sector 
staff
°Public facilities managed by NGOs performed 
better on:
   -Child diarrhea treatment
   -Prenatal care 
   -Tetanus and typhoid immunization 
°NGO facilities performed similar to traditional 
public providers
°Patient satisfaction higher for both types of NGO 
facilities compared to traditional public facilities 
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TABLE 13. RAISING FACILITY PERFORMANCE: EXPERIENCES FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES (CONTINUED) 
 
Program/Country/Study Incentives and Benchmarks Accountability and Management Results Comment
Haiti
1
Three health facilities 
before and after 
contracted out to NGOs
Eichler, Auxila, Antoine, 
and Desmangles (2007)
°NGOs receive 95% of budget under existing 
contract
°Can earn up to 10% of historical budget if meet 
targets:
°Five performance measures:
   -Share of mothers using ORT for diarrhea
   -Full vaccination children under 1 year
   -3 or more prenatal visits
   -Reduction in discontinuation rate for 
contraceptives
   -Number of delivery points with at least four 
modern FP-methods and outreach points with 
three or more modern methods
°Increased spending flexibility
°Reduced reporting requirements
°Independent party determined whether 
performance targets were met
For at least 2/3 NGOs:
°Increase in immunization coverage
°Increase in availability of modern family planning 
methods
°Increase in utilization of ORS
°Increase in correct utilization of ORS
°Decrease in prenatal visits
°Increase in discontinuation rates for 
contraceptives
°All three NGOs received 
more funding
°Difficult to attribute 
improvements solely to 
performance payments 
since technical assistance 
and data validation 
programs were introduced 
at the same time
°Since the pilot in 1999 the 
program has been scaled 
up to 25 NGOs
Panama
San Miguelito Hospital 
contracted out all 
services, suppliers and 
management vs. two 
traditional public hospitals
Bitrán and Gómez (2005)
°Paid under prospective payment by category
°Hospital Board and monitoring group contracts 
out and oversees all services
°Purchase contracts between the Hospital Board 
and contractors, payment conditional on meeting 
targets
°Seven output indicators including:
   -Discharges
   -Number of visits
°Nine efficiency indicators including:
   -ALOS
   -Bed occupancy rates
°Eight quality indicators including:
   -Accreditation
   -Mortality rates
°Contracts with suppliers of HR services can be 
terminated and staff dismissed
°Higher provider productivity
°Lower unit costs (except for maternity)
°Higher patient satisfaction
°Higher management costs
°Greater efficiency (e.g. lower ALOS)




30 district hospitals 
participating in program 
vs. control hospitals 
(RCT)
Solon et al. (2009)
°Performance-based payment for hospitals and 
physicians
°Performance measured by quality score 
assessed by vignettes (70%), patient satisfaction 
(20%), and case load (10%)
°If hospital meets quality target receives bonus for 
distribution among physicians and other health 
staff
°Peer pressure since facility financial targets must 
be met for individual bonuses to be paid
° Significantly higher quality scores:
   -Improved physician performance
   -Increased patient satisfaction




Comparison of 3 models: 
NGOs with block grant,  
NGOs with block grant 
and performance pay vs. 
control group of for-profit, 
public, and NGO providers
Lundberg (2008)
°Providers receiving performance payments for 
meeting three out of six targets:
   -10% increase in outpatient visits
   -5% increase in acceptance of modern family 
planning methods
   -10% increase in immunized children
   -5% increase in number of skilled birth 
attendance
   -10% increase in antenatal visits
   -10% increase in child malaria treated
°Facilities receive bonus equivalent to 1% of base 
grant if target sustained for 6 months
°Extra bonuses earned by meeting two or more 
targets
°Increased spending flexibility °22 out of 24 providers in the bonus group 
received bonuses
°Most facilities in the bonus group met the targets 
but did not outperform the ones in "the block grant 
only group" or "the control group"
°Additional bonuses did not lead to better 
performance
°Bonuses may have been 
too small to have any 
noticeable effect 
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6. Informal Payments 
Corruption is a clear case of good governance gone wrong. Informal payments by 
definition lack performance fundamentals –incentives are wrong, information absent 
and accountability missing (see Box 1). Institutional performance as outlined in Figure 
1 becomes dysfunctional where informal payments drive the financing and delivery of 
health care. Indeed their perpetuation suggests breakdown of public sector operations 
and both inequity and inefficiency in service provision. While fees are appropriate for 
the private sector illegal charging for free public services is simply a form of corruption 
and undermines good governance, provider performance, and fair access to publicly 
funded and delivered services. 
Increasing evidence from across the world points to the phenomenon of under-the-table 
payments that patients are required to make to obtain the services of specific providers; 
for upgraded services; to reduce waiting times; as “insurance” for potential future visits; 
or simply for basic diagnostics and treatment at “free” public hospitals or clinics. 
Informal payments can be defined as “payments to individual and institutional 
providers, in kind or cash, made outside official payment channels, or purchases meant 
to be covered by the health care system” and they are a form of corruption meeting the 
corruption criterion of “use of public office for private gains” (Lewis 2007: 985; 
Bardhan, 1997).
20 Where such informal payments are required, often health workers at 
all levels charge informally with orderlies expecting compensation for moving patients 
within the hospital, nurses charging for their care, and physicians setting their own 
charges for diagnosis and treatment. The amount charged tends to vary with location, 
type of service, the provider, and in some cases, patient income. 
Informal payments in public clinics and hospitals are a form of corruption, which raises 
serious issues that are very difficult to address. Informal payments are sometimes 
argued to be a coping strategy used by health workers to deal with low pay, instead, it 
may be more useful to view the practice as a response to opportunity. Charging under-
the-table represents a trade-off between bribes earned and income lost if caught and 
dismissed. When the probability of being detected, and if detected penalized, is very 
low, as is the case in many developing and transition countries, informal payments tend 
to be more widespread. 
The frequency of informal payments in the health sector offers an important indicator of 
underlying governance failures because it means fraudulent behavior is being tolerated, 
and it also offers insights into the extent of the problem within and across countries. The 
evidence, however, is surprisingly fragmented with a lack of country-level data and 
indicators that thwart meaningful cross-country comparisons.  
Relevant data aimed at informing policy can be obtained by collecting information on 
the prevalence of such practices and how they operate through household surveys, 
facility exit surveys, and governance and anti-corruption studies, providing a basis for 
                                                            
20 Shortages of supplies and drugs at points of service often force patients to purchase these items (Tatar 
et al. 2007; Zaidi et al. 2009). This is an example of patient payments that do not constitute corruption as 
fees are not paid directly to providers for specific services but signal governance failure. 
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understanding the scope and nature of informal payments in the health sector. 
Qualitative surveys complement, and provide a deeper perspective on the phenomena.  
How widespread are informal payments? 
A major challenge is differentiating among formal, informal, and gratitude payments in 
the presence of official co-payments and voluntary gift-giving by grateful patients. 
Where all fees have been banned any payment by households is clearly unofficial but in 
many countries formal fees do exist and blur the dichotomy. It then becomes the 
amount of payment, the nature of the transaction, and its timing that determine whether 
the payment is informal or not (Lewis 2006). For example, in the Kyrgyz Republic in 
2001, 95 percent of those who paid for services did not receive a receipt while only 3 
percent reported giving a gift to the health personnel at the time of service (Falkingham 
2002). 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of survey respondents who recently used public health 
facilities and reported making informal payments. The data are for 12 countries for 
which recent World Bank data are available. More than 35 percent of respondents in 
Sierra Leone and 30 percent in Ghana reported making informal payments. In Russia 
and Paraguay by contrast, “only” five percent did. A breakdown of informal payments 
for hospital and general health services show that without exception, a larger share of 
households reported making informal payments for hospitalizations. Evidence from four 
Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, 
further corroborates this, finding that informal payments are typically associated with 
surgery and inpatient services (CEEHN 2002).  
Table 14 presents additional country data on informal payments, which provide a sense 
not only of their frequency but also of their size in these countries. The share of 
households that report having made informal payment for health services is highly 
variable across countries, ranging from 3 percent in Peru to 22 percent in Guinea. In all 
countries informal payments make up a large share of half-monthly per capita income, 
from 15 percent in Paraguay to 113 percent in Madagascar. These data clearly show 
how informal payments in health care can constitute a major burden on household 
resources.  
The magnitude of informal payments can also vary substantially within countries. 
Household survey data from Kyrgyzstan in 2007 show that informal payments for 
hospitalization ranged from roughly 60 percent of half-monthly income in Issyk-Kul to 
around 125 percent in Naryn (Falkingham, Akkazieva, and Baschieri, forthcoming).
21 
Perception surveys of providers offer additional insights, and support the reports from 
patients. In Costa Rica, 85 percent of medical staff indicated that under-the-table 
payments to physicians were common (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). A study of 30 
municipal hospitals in Bolivia in 1998 asked physicians and nurses how common they 
considered bribes for hospital services (Gray-Molina et al. 2001). More than 25 percent 
of physicians and 23 percent of nurses answered that bribes were required “a lot” or 
“always. When asked about corrupt practices in their own workplace, 65 percent of 
                                                            
21 National average income was used for the computations since regional average incomes were not 
available.  
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physicians reported that “misreferral of patients to private practice” and “payments for 
scheduling of medical procedures” occurred “a lot” or “always”.  
 
FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF USERS REPORTING INFORMAL PAYMENTS IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2000-2006 
 
Often informal payments are not uniform across payers. An Albanian study found that 
income had no effect on the probability of having to pay informally (Hotchkiss et al. 
2005). By contrast, evidence from Uganda and Peru suggests that the richer pay more, 
and receive more health care in return (Hunt 2007). Similar evidence emerges from the 
Kyrgyz Republic (forthcoming), which also found that patients making informal 
payments and those making official payments are not the same raising the possibility 
that patients pay informally to avoid paying official fees. Studies in China of “red 
packages” paid to providers report that payments average between US$16-36 per 
hospital visit, with referral hospitals averaging US$44, roughly 90 percent of average 
half-monthly income (Bloom, Han, and Li 2001). Data from a Living Standard Survey 
in Tajikistan showed that informal payments deterred poorer households from seeking 
care, and also affected the appropriateness of care received (Falkingham 2004). In some 
cases, informal payments drive households into poverty by forcing them to sell assets or 
borrow at unfavorable rates to pay for health care (Lewis 2000; Falkingham 2002). 
These same problems can confront households even when they rely on the private 
sector. However, what is insidious in the former case is that health care financed and 















Sources: World Bank Country Diagnostic Surveys (various years) and LSMS (various years). 
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made available free-of-charge by government is effectively inaccessible to the public 
unless they pay again, and do so illegally. Moreover, if patients believe they will be 
asked for informal payments at health facilities they may choose to go without care 
(Lewis 2006). 
 
TABLE 14. INCIDENCE AND MAGNITUDE OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS FOR 
HEALTH IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2001-2006 
 
A special case of informal payments involves supplementary in-kind medical costs for 
necessary medical supplies and care that should be provided by the health facility but 
are not. In Tajikistan, family members bathed, fed, provided medical and non-medical 
supplies, and even administered injections to their relatives (Falkingham 2004). While 
part of these costs are incurred as voluntary activities by families to help defray the 
costs of medical care, some of these also reflect governance failure on the part of health 
care providers, especially when these activities include responsibilities such as 




Policy options for discouraging informal payments in health systems are not well 
understood and tend to vary across situations and the existing evidence is inconclusive. 
The argument that informal payments ensure health service delivery where otherwise 
only very limited services would be provided, or no services at all, fails to address the 
problem of corruption.
22 Some suggestive lessons indicate that the introduction of 
formal user fees may reduce informal payments under certain conditions. The 
combination of improved provider incentives and mechanisms to hold providers 
accountable have also been shown effective in some settings.  
Combining incentives and accountability to discourage informal payments 
In most cases informal payments benefit individual health workers but not the provider 
institution. By contrast, formal user fee revenues tend to benefit from fiduciary 
oversight and contribute to health service provision. The introduction of formal user 
fees that provide supplementary compensation for providers who previously benefitted 
from informal payments appears to discourage informal payments. But the success of 
                                                            
22 For example, in the former Soviet Union informal payments were considered a necessity to compensate 
health workers given their low wages (Balbanova 2007). 
Informal payment for general health 
services as % of half-monthly per 
capita
Share of households that report 
making informal payments (%)
Benin (2006) 53 4
Guatemala (2005) 23 16
Guinea (2005) 43 22
Madagascar (2006) 113 15
Paraguay (2006) 15 5
Peru (2001) 20 3
Source: World Bank Country Diagnostic Survey (various years). 
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such programs depends heavily on their design and the specific context in which they 
are implemented. Moreover, such policies require exemptions or subsidies to 
accommodate the poor. These are best accomplished through some form of sliding 
scale, and most countries have adopted some form of means test for patients. 
In a Cambodian referral hospital, the formalization of fees resulted in near elimination 
of informal payments, more predictable fees for patients, an increase in hospital 
revenue, and higher utilization levels (Barber, Bonnet, and Bekedam 2004). The 
formalization of fees was undertaken within a program that entailed several components 
crucial to its success: a transparent official fee system designed to generate additional 
income for health staff, staffing levels based on demand for services, and the 
establishment of a hospital management committee with staff representation. Contracts 
regulating the relationship between individual health workers and the management 
committee were drawn up to align bonuses with staff performance. If a staff member 
failed to comply with hospital regulations, including hours worked and treatment of 
patients’ privacy, the bonus could be withdrawn, and in the case of serious offenses, 
dismissal would result. This case of formalization of fees arguably succeeded because it 
comprised additional earnings for staff generated by the formal user fees, performance 
incentives, and monitoring of staff performance that together made staff accountable for 
their performance (also see Annex 2).  
Another case of formalizing fees, part of a pilot program, in two regions in the Kyrgyz 
Republic also succeeded in significantly reducing informal payments for health services 
with the share of patients reporting paying informally declining from 60 percent to 38 
percent in the pilot regions compared to 70 percent in the rest of the country (Kutzin et 
al. 2003; Lewis 2007).
23 But the fee formalization was part of a larger reform program, 
which also introduced administrative sanctions for poor performance and provided 
information on fees to patients and providers, making attribution to the introduction of 
formal user fees difficult.  Evidence on whether the reduction in informal payments was 
sustained over time is lacking though (Balbanova 2007). 
The combination of clear rules and transparency of hospital fees, sharing of earned 
revenue with staff, non-financial rewards for physicians, and sanctioning for 
inappropriate charging helped discourage informal payments in the Children’s Hospital 
in Tbilisi, Georgia (Garcia-Prado 2005). As an autonomous public hospital it has the 
authority to set and allocate revenues from fees. The hospital management pooled fee 
revenues and physicians receive a portion of the earnings to supplement their fixed 
public wages. Nonetheless, physicians continued charging their patients informally and 
shared none of the additional revenue with the hospital. In response the following 
changes were made: (1) increased supervision of hospital staff; (2) official fees publicly 
posted throughout the hospital and informal charges prohibited; (3) reduced physician 
contracts from 3 years to 6 months with renewal subject to volume of patients treated 
and level of fee revenue earned; and, (4) introduced non-financial performance rewards 
for physicians such as preferred hours of work and leave, public recognition, and 
continuing education and training. A few months after introducing the new incentives 
patient payment aligned with the official charges posted in the hospital and hospital 
                                                            
23 Under the program patients pay a fixed rate for hospital admission covering all care, drugs, and food, 
differentiated at five levels (Balbanova 2007).   
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revenues increased sharply.  The combined effect of a transparent system tying earnings 
to activity, sanctions for inappropriate behavior, and provision of professional 
opportunities, together changed the performance of the hospital. Ferreting out the 
marginal contribution of any of the reforms is difficult but the success of the effort in 
eliminating informal payments suggests that such efforts can improve performance in 
health care delivery while at the same time curbing corrupt practices. 
Voice and informal payments 
Evidence on the effect of voice on informal payments is limited. A study of 30 
municipal hospitals in Bolivia carried out in 1998 (Gray-Molina et al. 2001). The 
empirical analysis suggested that voice as measured by citizen health board 
participation, was significantly associated with lower informal payments.
24 However, 
“one complication is that voice is not sufficient for accountability; it may lead to 
answerability but it does not necessarily lead to enforceability” (WDR 2004: 79), and 
without knowledge of the exact role of communities on health boards (for example, did 
they have the authority to sanction providers charging informally) it is not possible to 
determine whether voice alone, or combined with authority, was responsible for the 
lower informal payments. 
 
 
7.  Corruption Perceptions 
As noted in the previous section, corruption reflects a breakdown in good governance 
and the undermining of service provision. Indeed, corruption brings into question the 
viability of the governance process summarized in Figure 1, and suggests that 
accountability of service providers is either not enforced or non-existent. Surveys that 
reveal corruption in the health sector provide feedback on how public health care 
delivery is perceived, although they cannot offer guidance on specific areas for policy 
or program intervention. The ability of government to deliver on its commitments in the 
sector is severely compromised where corruption is endemic. Corruption perceptions 
complement the performance indicators discussed above and highlight the extent to 
which attention needs to be focused on curbing illegal practices. The concepts in Box 1 
apply here, but reaching acceptable performance where corruption is concerned requires 
considerably more effort since corruption tends to be invisible and difficult to measure, 
undermines incentives, and reflects a lack of authority and accountability. Thus, 
perceptions of corruption are useful for diagnosis and tracking progress over time but 
need to be complemented by more precise measures to identify levers that can help raise 
performance. 
Perceptions of the health sector and of health service delivery provide a guide to how 
public services are performing. While perceptions of actual performance or corruption 
are not completely accurate, they can affect the behavior of both providers and patients. 
The ability to cover households as well as providers and the private sector make 
perception surveys useful. They also signal how well public investments in the sector 
                                                            
24 The availability of private health care options was also significantly correlated with lower informal 
payments but the effect was smaller than for voice.  
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are perceived, which in turn tends to influence utilization and public support for 
publicly financed health care. The alternative to perceptions surveys is household 
surveys that are more costly but can provide more extensive evidence and context on 
how the sector is performing in meeting citizen preferences.  
Corruption perception surveys by the World Bank, AfroBarometer, 
AmericasBarometer, and Transparency International among others, focus on specific 
sectors including health, and provide perceptions of the extent of corruption in the 
sector. Results are typically reported either as the share of citizens, business people, 
experts, or public officials reporting worse-than-neutral corruption outcomes, or as an 
average of all scores.  
Perceptions of corruption in the health sector vary across countries (Figure 7). For the 
countries for which there are data, the largest shares of households perceiving the health 
sector as corrupt are in Sierra Leone, Honduras, and Colombia and range from 50-56 
percent of respondents, to the “smallest” in Indonesia (20 percent) and Zambia (24 
percent).  
 
FIGURE 7. SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS PERCEIVING 
HEALTH AS CORRUPT, 2001-2006 (PERCENT) 
 
Respondents in different positions generally have different experiences with and 
insights into corruption. For instance, a public official may be aware that there is 
purchasing of positions whereas households may be more aware of the necessity of 


























































































































































































































Source: World Bank Country Diagnostics (various years). 
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Paraguay and Ghana, a larger share of households than public officials perceive the 
health sector as corrupt. 
Countries with better institutions should in theory be less corrupt. The World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) offers a measure of institutional 
quality. It includes a subcategory that assesses national policies affecting access to and 
quality of health care (World Bank OPCS 2007c). The scores range from 1–6 (6 
indicating higher quality institutions) and are based on the assessments of health experts 
working on the country against a sample of regional benchmark countries.  
Average regional CPIA scores for building human resources for health are shown in 
Figure 8. In 2007, Eastern Europe and Central Asia had the highest average regional 
score followed by South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest average score. But 
there is of course significant variation across countries within each region. These scores 
reflect perceptions of policy priorities, execution of policy, and the institutional quality 
of the entities providing health services and therefore, provide a sense of health sector 
performance. 
 
FIGURE 8: CPIA SCORES FOR BUILDING HUMAN RESOURCES IN HEALTH BY 
REGION, 2007 
 
A study of a road building project in Indonesia tested how closely perceptions of 
corruption corresponded to missing expenditures in the project (Olken 2006). Villagers’ 
perceptions of corruption were found to be positively correlated with missing 
expenditures. However, further examination suggested the potential for corruption 
perceptions to be misleading. In particular, in more ethnically diverse villages perceived 









































































Q9a: Health care and nutrition services
Q9c: Prevention of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases
Note: Unweighted regional averages of CPIA scores for questions 9a and 9c.
Source: World Bank OPCS (2007c). 
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more homogenous villages, underlining the importance of supplementing corruption 
perception measures with more objective ones. 
Another approach to capturing perceptions of health sector institutions and performance 
is patient satisfaction surveys at exit. Satisfaction surveys complement evidence on 
perceptions of and experience with corruption and public health service delivery 
performance. Recent survey data from Indonesia has been used to examine whether 
patient satisfaction surveys can guide policy. The findings suggest that perceptions data 
are not as useful for direct interpretation for policy as they are for providing insights to 
policymakers on the priorities of citizens, and on the acceptability and impact of 
specific reforms such as decentralization (Dasgupta, Narayan, and Skoufias 2009). This 
is broadly consistent with our views on corruption surveys and their usefulness to the 
policy debate on health. 
Patient satisfaction surveys on hospital performance suggest that greater efficiency 
improves perceived quality, which may indeed reflect reality since greater efficiency is 
associated with shorter wait times, greater availability of inputs and overall better 
organization. In Central America, studies in two countries have examined the link 
between efficiency and patient satisfaction. In Panama, patients reported much higher 
satisfaction with the most efficient hospital that contracted out all services (shorter 
lengths of stay, lower unit costs, and highest productivity for surgery) as compared to 
two traditional, publicly staffed and managed facilities. In Guatemala, low income, rural 
patients preferred the more efficient contracted NGO services to those of the 
government (as measured by performance in delivering immunizations, prenatal care 
and micronutrients) (La Forgia 2005). 
High scores on perceived corruption, and low scores on perceived institutional quality 
and performance all provide red flags and indicate the need to assess possible 
corruption and shortcomings in service delivery and financing. The objective is to use 
perception indicators to identify areas in the health sector where governance is poor, 





The role of good governance in raising health service delivery performance is important 
and provides a useful entry point for discussions of policy, programs, and 
implementation. Considerable work exists on how to design sound health service 
delivery programs – quality of inputs and budget and financial management for 
example. Much of that knowledge informs the countries’ health agendas. However, the 
challenge of translating those concepts and actions into functioning and effective health 
systems is a harder and more complicated step. It moves into the realm of political 
economy to align the interests of stakeholders and ensure that they face the appropriate 
incentives and accountabilites to perform as intended.  
The gap between good ideas and evidence-based programs on the one hand, and health 
performance and outcomes on the other, is often significant. The governance agenda 
focuses on the elements of implementation, the factors that drive performance and make  
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sound technical designs successful in a public context. In effect, good governance offers 
tools for the middle ground between program design and its execution. 
This paper provides a definition of good governance in health and a framework for 
thinking about governance issues as a way of improving performance in the health 
sector. While outcomes are critical, measures of performance indicate whether the 
health system is meeting its objectives; whether resources are being used appropriately; 
and if the priorities of the government are being implemented. 
The paper proposes performance indicators that offer the potential for comparable 
measures, and whose collection is not overly complex or costly but have relevance at 
the national level as well as at the facility level. These measures, when available, are 
useful tools for cross-country comparisons and for tracking relative health performance, 
and provide the context for the discussion of good governance in health service 
delivery.  
The crucial elements for good governance and high performance include standards, 
incentives, information, and accountability, all of which support implementation. The 
paper reviews budget and financial management issues; examines human resource 
policies and individual provider performance; health facility performance, issues 
surrounding informal payments for services and jobs; and summarizes evidence on 
corruption perceptions in health. This review of ideas and evidence is intended to 
contribute to the design of policies, programs, and assessment of options for improving 
health delivery performance. 
While virtually none of the indicators or evidence applies to all countries, they provide 
a basis for measuring performance. Experiences from other countries are useful in 
designing programs or conducting analytic work where performance is an issue. This 
paper is not meant to be a catalogue of the possible but an effort to define and analyze 
the main governance and performance issues in health service delivery. However, much 
more work needs to be done to fully understand how best to improve governance in the 
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ANNEX 1. SELECT AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
Governance encompasses multiple aspects. These include the capacity of the 
government to formulate sound policies, manage resources, and provide services 
efficiently; the effective processes that allow citizens to select, hold accountable, 
monitor, and replace government; and the respect of government and citizens for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions. Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007) break these down into six specific areas: voice and accountability; 
government effectiveness; control of corruption; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
political stability and absence of violence. Of the six, the first three are directly relevant 
to good governance in health. 
Voice and accountability captures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in the selection of their government, as well as the extent to which public 
institutions are held accountable. It allows citizens to express their preferences and be 
involved in the decision-making processes. This dimension also covers freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and the presence of a free media. In health, a system 
with a high level of accountability, one possessing checks and balances; transparent 
decision-making; access to information; and effective monitoring and evaluation, can 
improve resource management, reduce corruption, and enhance public service delivery, 
and ultimately, improve the quality of health service delivery. 
Government effectiveness is reflected in the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, the effectiveness of public service delivery, the quality of the civil 
service, and the degree of policy independence from political pressures. In health, this 
dimension is concerned with, for example, the efficiency of health systems in areas such 
as licensing requirements; hiring procedures for physicians; and the presence and 
enforcement of national and local statutes on delivering quality health for all. 
Control of corruption captures the extent to which there are checks to ensure that public 
power is not abused for private gain or that there is no “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. In the health sector, forms of corruption include but are not limited 
to nepotism; purchasing of posts; irregularities in the procurement of medical 




ANNEX 2. RAISING INDIVIDUAL PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: EXPERIENCES FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
Program/Country/Study Incentives and Benchmarks Accountability and Management Results Comment
Brazil
State of São Paulo
12 public autonomously 
managed (OSS) hospitals 
vs. 12 traditional hospitals
La Forgia and Couttolenc 
(2008)
°Hospital directors discretion to set individual 
wages and develop training and non-financial 
benefits
°Opportunities for professional development
°Hospital directors discretion to manage 
all performance issues: 
   -Recruit and dismiss staff
   -Promote staff
   -Determine staff mix
°More efficient (e.g. more patient 
admissions/hospital bed)
°Higher quality services (e.g. lower overall 
mortality rates)
°No staff absenteeism
°Program part of a larger reform 
package to raise hospital 
performance




Three health centers 
contracted for NGO 
management vs. control 
facilities
Soeters and Griffith (2003)
°Basic monthly payment (55%) for 3-month 
contract period 
°Punctuality incentive (15%) with confirmation of 
attendance
°Individual performance bonus (30%) if monthly 
facility financial targets met
°Peer pressure since facility financial 
targets must be met for individual 
bonuses to be paid
Over one-year period:
°Increase in inpatient days
°Increase in outpatient consultations
°Utilization levels remained below target
°Bonus had minimal effect on staff 
performance as staff earned less 
than from informal payments 
°See Table 13 for follow-up phase 
where initiative led to performance 
improvements
Cambodia
One provincial referral 
hospital
Before and after reforms
Barber, Bonnet, and 
Bekedam (2004)
°Monthly bonus for:
   -Meeting qualifications
   -Level of responsibility
   -Hospital activity
°Additional individual bonus for:
   -Attendance during contracted hours (70%)
   -Quality of performance (30%)
°If violate hospital regulations bonus withheld
°Peer pressure since individual bonus 
depends on meeting facility financial 
targets
°Monthly evaluation of staff performance 
by clinical supervisor
°Serious misconduct can lead to 
dismissal
°Sustained increase in inpatient admissions
°Initial increase in outpatient consultations; 
not sustained
°Patients guaranteed official prices
°Significant reduction in informal payments
°Base wage plus bonus 
comparable to previous informal 
earnings
°Most staff received bonuses; 
managment reluctant to withold 





Before and after reforms
Garcia-Prado (2005)
°Support for continuing education and training
°High performing physicians rewarded with:
   -Preferred hours of work
   -Preferred leave
   -Publicly-awarded recognition
°Length of physician contracts reduced 
from 3 years to 6 months; renewal 
subject to number of patients treated 
and level of fee revenue earned
°Increased supervision of hospital staff 
°Formally prohibited informal charging
°Patient payments aligned with official user 
fees and elimination of informal payments
°Notable increase in hospital revenues 
°Improved patient satisfaction 
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Program/Country/Study Incentives and Benchmarks Accountability and Management Results Comment
Philippines
10 provinces
30 district hospitals 
participating in program 
vs. control hospitals (RCT)
Solon et al. (2009)
°Performance-based payment for physicians (and 
hospitals)
°Performance measured by quality score 
assessed by vignettes (70%), patient satisfaction 
(20%), and case load (10%)
°If hospital meets quality target receives bonus for 
distribution among physicians and other health 
staff
°Peer pressure since facility financial 
targets must be met for individual 
bonuses to be paid
°Significantly higher quality scores:
   -Improved physician performance
   -Increased patient satisfaction
   -Raised physician case load
Rwanda
Butare district
19 health centers vs. 
control health centers 
Messen et al. (2006)
°Variable performance bonus based on share of 
monthly facility from fee-for-service program
°Bonus determined by qualifications, level of 
responsibility, and attendance during contracted 
hours
°Bonus cuts for poor performance
°Contract between individual workers 
and health centers stipulate that patient 
abuse, violation of the code of conduct, 
and fraud, constitute breaches that can 
be penalized
°Audit and close supervision
°Increase in individual productivity
°Increase in targeted outputs:
   -New consultations
   -Case/inhabitant/year
   -Deliveries at health center
   -Assisted deliveries
   -Immunization rates
°Health centers granted more 
discretion to manage resources
°Attribution difficult with other 
reforms introduced simultaneously
°Scaling up to national level 
underway (See Table 13)
Tanzania
Arusha region
40 health clinics NGO 
physicians vs. public 
sector physicians
Leonard, Masatu, and 
Vialou (2005)
°NGO facility head discretion to set wages °NGO facility head discretion to hire and 
dismiss staff  
°NGO physicians with similar ability perform 
better on average than public sector 
physicians (as measured by vignettes and 
direct observation)